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I. INTRODUCTION
More than any other area of tort law, the law of product 
liability has been the subject of continuing debate regarding the 
interrelated issues of its proper rationales and grounds of liability.  
Although the seeds of the debate go back at least 100 years, it 
flowered into its mature form in 1944 in Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co.,1 in which the majority of the California Supreme Court 
used an expansive application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to 
hold the defendant liable for inferred negligence.2 In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Roger Traynor relied on four different rationales—
efficient compensation, efficient deterrence, inferred negligence, and 
consumer expectations3—to argue that liability for defective 
                                                
* Copyright © 2007 Richard W. Wright.  All rights reserved.  Permission is 
hereby granted to copy for noncommercial use as long as appropriate citation is 
made to this publication.
** Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology.  I greatly appreciate the invitation to participate in this symposium, 
which spurred me finally to complete and publish this article, which was begun 
many years ago, and enabled me to present it as part of a panel that also included 
George Conk, David Owen and Jane Stapleton, who are leading experts in the field 
and valued scholarly colleagues and friends.  I also greatly appreciate the generous 
hospitality and patience of the editors and staff of The Review of Litigation. 
1. 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
2. See id. at 439-40; infra text accompanying and following notes 163-64.
3. See infra Part III.
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products should be strict.4  Almost twenty years later, in 1963, 
Traynor’s rationales and position were ratified and adopted in an 
opinion that he wrote for a unanimous court in Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc.5 The Greenman opinion was a catalyst for the 
adoption of strict product liability, based on the same rationales, in
Restatement Second section 402A,6 which in turn was rapidly 
adopted by most states in the United States and greatly influenced 
the adoption of product liability laws in other countries.7
However, as the courts attempted to apply strict liability as 
articulated in section 402A, renewed debate developed on the proper 
extent and grounds of product liability.8  By the time the Restatement 
Third was being drafted, it was generally agreed, at least among the 
courts, that liability for construction defects should be strict and that 
liability for warning defects should be based on negligence, while 
considerable disagreement remained about the proper grounds of 
liability for design defects.9  The Restatement Third continues to 
invoke all four of the rationales that Traynor set forth in Escola—
and a few more—to support strict liability for construction defects, 
but it asserts that those rationales do not support strict liability for 
design or warning defects, which it claims “are predicated on a 
different concept of responsibility”10 and were not prominent in the 
cases or a subject of significant consideration at the time that 
Restatement Second section 402A was drafted and adopted.11
It is true that at the time that section 402A was adopted no 
clear distinction was drawn between construction defects and design 
or warning defects, but this is not because little consideration was 
given to design or warning defects, but rather because the prevailing 
academic and judicial view was that there was no need to distinguish 
                                                
4. 150 P.2d at 440-44 (Traynor, J., concurring).
5. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). 
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmts. a, c, f, m (1965); 
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 974 (2000); MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES 
OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 16 (2006);  JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 24-25 
(1994).
7. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 975; GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 16, 18; 
STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 4, 24-25.
8. See infra Part II.
9. Id.
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD].
11. Id., Introduction at 3, § 1 cmt. a; accord, STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 25-
26, 30.
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the types of defect since it was assumed that strict liability should 
apply regardless of the type of defect.  Greenman itself involved a 
design defect, which the court loosely described as a “defect in 
design and manufacture,”12 and section 402A clearly was meant to 
encompass design and warning defects as well as construction 
defects. Their inclusion was the reason for the insertion of the 
mischievous phrase “unreasonably dangerous” in section 402A. 
This phrase, along with repetitive language in comments h through k, 
was intended to preclude strict liability for generic product risks if, 
but only if, those risks were unavoidable aspects of a useful and 
reasonably safe product and proper warnings were provided.13
The Restatement Third’s rote invocation of the efficiency 
rationales is unfortunate, not merely because they are normatively 
unappealing14 but also because they fail to explain or justify the 
differential treatment of construction defects and design and warning 
defects, or indeed any of the content or structure of past or current 
product liability law,15 which however can be explained and justified 
by Traynor’s other rationales, which are based on interactive justice 
                                                
12. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901; see id. at 899 (“[I]nadequate set screws were 
used to hold parts of the machine together . . . [T]here were other more positive 
ways of fastening the parts of the machine together, the use of which would have 
prevented the accident . . . .”); see STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 22 (“[I]t had also, 
by this time [the 1950s], become routine for the warranty concept to be applied to 
complaints not just about manufacturing errors, but about the design of the product 
itself . . . .”).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmts. h, i, j, k (1965); 
William L. Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS 
L.J. 9, 23-26 (1966); Roger Traynor, The Ways and Meaning of Defective Products 
and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 368-71 (1965).  Jane Stapleton 
incorrectly claims that “the Greenman-derived rule in California diverged sharply 
from that reflected in s 402A” when “it refused to require that the defect also be 
‘unreasonably dangerous’ as stated in s 402A.”  STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 29.  
The California court and other courts correctly noted that the “unreasonably 
dangerous” language ambiguously implies a negligence test, contrary to the intent 
of section 402A.  They thus properly eliminated it while retaining the basic 
consumer expectations test in section 402A, which is presented in comment i to 
section 402A as the meaning of “unreasonably dangerous.”  Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson 
Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1161-62 (1972); infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
14. Richard W. Wright, Justice and Reasonable Care in Negligence Law, 47 
AM. J. JUR. 143, 167-79 (2002) [hereinafter Wright, Justice]; George W. Conk, 
Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section 402A Flourished and the Third Restatement 
Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799, 800-06, 807-08, 838-39 (2007).
15. See infra Parts III.A & III.B.
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rather than efficiency.16 Except for its making the existence of a 
reasonable alternative design an independent requirement that the 
plaintiff must prove to establish a design defect, rather than only a 
factor to be considered in its consumer-oriented risk-utility analysis 
of reasonableness, the Restatement Third’s substantive provisions 
and comments present a generally accurate description of current 
product liability law.17  However, the Restatement Third’s reporters’ 
strong aversion to consumer expectations language and related 
preference for risk-utility balancing language conceals the generally 
consumer-oriented and justice-based nature of its substantive 
provisions, which understandably has led many courts to reject its 
formulation of the relevant provisions.18
In the remainder of this Article, I first summarize, in Part II, 
the content and structure of current product liability law and assess 
the extent to which the Restatement Third accurately reflects that 
content and structure.  I then consider, in Part III, the extent to which 
each of the traditional rationales for strict product liability explains 
and justifies the actual law and the Restatement Third’s provisions.
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND THE RESTATEMENT THIRD
A. Proper Parties, Cognizable Injuries, and Defenses
A product liability action lies against a person engaged in the 
business of selling or otherwise distributing products, who sold or 
distributed a defective product if that defect actually and proximately 
caused physical injury to the plaintiff’s person or property.19  
Whether the liability is strict or requires proof of negligence depends 
on the applicable definition of defect.  When true strict liability 
exists, it is always supplemental to negligence liability; the plaintiff 
can always bring a negligence action.20
                                                
16. See infra Parts III.C & III.D.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 96-116.
19. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, §§ 1 & cmt. d, 21.  As with tort law 
generally, liability may extend to third parties who suffer economic or emotional 
loss as a result of physical injury to another if they are sufficiently closely related 
to the physically injured person.  Id. § 21(b) & cmt. c.
20. Id. § 2 cmt. n.  Comment n would disallow submission to juries of 
separate “strict liability” and negligence claims for “factually identical” defective 
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If strict liability exists, it applies to sellers or distributors of 
products, but not services,21 and usually only if the product is new or 
rebuilt rather than used, especially if the used product is sold “as 
is.”22  Sellers and distributors of products include not only product 
manufacturers (including manufacturers of component parts), but 
also wholesalers, retailers, lessors, bailors, and others in the chain of 
commercial distribution of the product. The non-manufacturer 
sellers and distributors are strictly liable for selling or distributing a 
defective product even if the relevant definition of defect requires 
negligence on the part of the manufacturer.23  A few jurisdictions 
limit strict liability to manufacturers, and many subject non-
manufacturer sellers and distributors to strict liability only if the 
manufacturer is unavailable, insolvent, or likely to become 
insolvent.24  Although Restatement Second section 402A explicitly 
left the issue open,25 the cases since have clearly established that 
bystanders, as well as purchasers and users of the product, are proper 
plaintiffs in a product liability action, whether based on negligence 
or strict liability.26
Tort liability for physical injuries to person and property 
caused by defective products generally is not subject to contractual 
disclaimer, limitation, or waiver,27 except perhaps when there has 
been a fully informed, freely negotiated bargain for an adequate quid 
pro quo by consumers with sufficient bargaining power.28  Similarly, 
                                                                                                                
design or warning claims, on the ground that the supposed “strict liability” in 
reality requires proof of negligence.  Id.; see id. § 1 cmt. a (discussing the 
“rhetorical preference” of many courts for strict liability language while actually 
applying a negligence reasonableness test).
21. Id. § 19 & cmt. f.
22. Id. § 8 & cmt. a.
23. Id. §§ 1 & cmts. b, c & e, 2 cmt. o, 5, 20; STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 25-
26.
24. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. e.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A caveat & cmt. o (1965).
26. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 252.  Although there is no explicit reference 
to bystanders in the Restatement Third, it extends liability to bystanders by 
providing for liability for harm to “persons,” rather than to “the ultimate user or 
consumer” as in the Restatement Second section 402A.  Compare RESTATEMENT 
THIRD, supra note 10, § 1, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
(1965).  The Uniform Commercial Code also extends protection of a warranty (if it 
exists) to bystanders.  U.C.C. § 2-318 (1977).
27. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 18.
28. Id. § 18 cmt. d; GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 227-38. 
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a product user is contributorily negligent only when she behaves 
unreasonably in the light of risks posed to her by a defect in the 
product of which she was aware or, due to its obvious or patent 
nature, should have been aware.  She generally has no obligation to 
inspect products for defects but rather is entitled to assume that they 
are fit for the ordinary purposes for which they were made.  In 
almost all jurisdictions, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence is a 
partial rather than a complete defense, which often reduces rather 
than bars the plaintiff’s recovery.29
In the great majority of jurisdictions, there is no tort liability, 
under either negligence or strict product liability, for pure economic 
loss—injury to the plaintiff’s economic expectations that does not 
result from actual (or perhaps threatened) physical injury to the 
plaintiff’s person or property.  In most jurisdictions, injury to the 
product itself is treated as pure economic loss, on the ground that 
such injury merely results in a non-working product and thus a 
failure of the plaintiff’s economic expectations regarding the utility 
of the product itself.30  Some jurisdictions treat injury to the product 
itself as being recoverable physical injury, rather than non-
recoverable pure economic loss, if it occurs suddenly rather than 
gradually,31 but this distinction does not seem to have any rational 
basis other than simplistic imagery (sudden injuries seeming to be 
more “tort like”).
B. Construction Defects
Although no distinction among types of defect was clearly 
articulated in the initial cases or in Restatement Second section
402A, subsequent cases and commentary have distinguished three 
different types of defect: construction defects, design defects, and 
warning defects.32
Construction defects are deviations from the intended design 
of the product, which usually occur in only some instances of the 
product.33  The Restatement Third uses the term “manufacturing 
                                                
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965); RESTATEMENT 
THIRD, supra note 10, § 17 & cmt. a; GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 238-41.
30. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 21 & cmts. a & d.
31. Id. § 21 reporters’ note cmt. d.
32. Id. § 1 cmt. a.
33. Id. §§ 1 cmt. a, 2(a).
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defect” rather than “construction defect,” but the defect can arise 
(e.g., through mishandling) as the product passes through the chain 
of commercial distribution after its manufacture, and strict liability 
will attach to any seller or distributor in the chain who passes the 
product along in a defective condition.34
Except for those few jurisdictions that have not adopted any 
form of strict product liability, there is general agreement that 
liability for construction defects is strict, rather than requiring proof 
of negligence.35
C. Warning Defects
Liability for a defective warning requires proof of 
negligence.  Section 2(c) of the Restatement Third states that a 
product is “defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings 
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have 
been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions 
or warnings . . . and the omission of the instructions or warnings 
renders the product not reasonably safe.”36 For both warnings and 
designs, the Restatement claims to “rely on a reasonableness test 
traditionally used in determining whether an actor has been 
negligent,” which supposedly requires “determinations that the 
product could have reasonably been made safer by a better design or 
instruction or warning”37 as determined through a “risk-utility 
balancing” tradeoff of costs and benefits to product sellers and users 
in order to create “incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal 
levels of safety in designing and marketing products.”38
These statements are inaccurate with respect to both designs 
and warnings, and the inaccuracies are insufficiently remedied by 
language that was added after the inaccuracies were pointed out 
during the consideration of the relevant provisions by the American 
Law Institute.39  
                                                
34. Id. §§ 1 & cmt. e, 2 cmts. c & o.
35. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2(a) & cmt. a.
36. Id. § 2(c).
37. Id. § 1 cmt. a.
38. Id. § 2 cmt. a; see id. § 2 cmt. n (“design and warning claims rest on a 
risk-utility assessment”).
39. See Am. Law Inst., Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: 
Products Liability, 71 A.L.I. PROC. 104, 135-37 (1994) (colloquy among Richard 
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In the first place, the definition of a defective warning in 
section 2(c) ignores an important distinction between “risk 
reduction” warnings regarding proper use, which if followed will 
reduce or eliminate the risk involved in using the product, and 
“informed choice” warnings regarding inherent, irreducible risks 
involved in using the product, which if warned about will not lead to 
any reduction in the risks involved in using the product but might 
cause a person to avoid those risks by deciding not to use the 
product.  The addition of the words “or avoided” in section 2(c) and 
an expanded discussion of informed choice warnings in comment i to 
section 2 were intended to more clearly recognize and state this 
distinction,40 but the attempt is undermined by the retention of the 
requirement in section 2(c) that, in order for an omission of a 
warning to be defective, the omission must render the product “not 
reasonably safe.”41  Although comment i asserts, as a fiat, that 
omission of a required informed choice warning “renders the product 
not reasonably safe,” this is not true under any ordinary 
interpretation of that phrase.  A reasonably designed product with 
reasonable risk-reduction warnings regarding use is “reasonably 
safe,” despite the absence of an informed-choice warning regarding 
inherent unavoidable risks that, if given, might lead some people to 
decide for their own particular reasons, as is their right, not to use the 
product.42  Indeed, the omission of the informed-choice warning 
might even reduce the overall risk of injury, if the use of the product, 
although involving an irreducible risk, would have eliminated or 
reduced a greater risk of injury from some other source.
Moreover, no “risk-utility balancing” tradeoff of costs and 
benefits to product sellers and users, in order to create “incentives for 
manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and 
marketing products,”43 is involved in deciding on the reasonableness 
                                                                                                                
W. Wright, Aaron D. Twerski, and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.); infra text 
accompanying notes 89-95.
40. See Fax from Richard W. Wright, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent 
College of Law, to James A. Henderson, Jr., Professor of Law, Cornell Law 
School (June 2, 1994) (on file with author); Fax from James A. Henderson, Jr., 
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, to Richard Wright, Professor of Law, 
Chicago-Kent College of Law (June 8, 1994) (on file with author).
41. See supra text accompanying note 36.
42. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1006. 
43. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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of product designs or warnings.  This is especially clear for 
warnings. As part of the language added to comment i states,
[W]arnings must be provided for inherent risks that 
reasonably foreseeable product users and consumers 
would reasonably deem material or significant in 
deciding whether to use or consume the product.  
Whether or not many persons would, when warned, 
nonetheless decide to use or consume the product, 
warnings are required to protect the interests of those 
reasonably foreseeable users or consumers who 
would, based on their own reasonable assessments of 
the risks and benefits [to them], decline product use or 
consumption.44
As in non-product cases, the materiality or significance issue 
is properly analyzed from the autonomy-oriented perspective of what 
the foreseeable consumer would want to know rather than the 
paternalistic perspective of what the product seller thinks the 
consumer should know.45  The economic costs to the product 
manufacturer or seller of providing a warning—for example, the 
direct costs of designing and providing an adequate warning and the 
indirect cost in sales (and related jobs etc.) lost due to the warning—
are not taken into account.  Rather, the negligence analysis is a 
qualitative one that focuses solely on the interests of those put at 
risk.  As the Restatement Third recognizes, the only “balancing” that 
occurs takes place in evaluating the adequacy of the required 
warning, which is based entirely on its feasibility and expected 
effectiveness:46
                                                
44. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. i.  The statement in 
comment i that “[j]udicial decisions supporting the duty to provide warnings for 
informed decisionmaking have arisen almost exclusively with regard to . . . toxic 
agents and pharmaceutical products,” id., is contradicted by comment k, which 
notes the “general rule in cases involving allergic reactions . . . that a warning is 
required when the harm-causing ingredient is one to which a substantial number of 
people are allergic” and that “virtually any tangible product can contain an 
ingredient to which some person may be allergic” and lists a wide range of non-
toxic, non-pharmaceutical products that “have all been involved in litigation” 
regarding insufficient warnings.  Id. § 2 cmt. k.
45. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 655-56, 658-59, 1006-07.
46. Id. at 1006-07.
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Although the liability standard is formulated in 
essentially identical terms [for defective designs and 
warnings], the defectiveness concept is more difficult 
to apply in the warnings context.  In evaluating the 
adequacy of product warnings and instructions, courts 
must be sensitive to many factors.  It is impossible to 
identify anything approaching a perfect level of detail 
that should be communicated in product disclosures. . 
. .  In some cases, excessive detail may detract from 
the ability of typical users and consumers to focus on 
important aspects of the warnings, whereas in others 
reasonably full disclosure will be necessary to enable 
informed, efficient choices by product users. . . .  No 
easy guideline exists for courts to adopt in assessing 
the adequacy of product warnings and instructions.  In 
making their assessments, courts must focus on 
various factors, such as content and 
comprehensibility, intensity of expression, and the 
characteristics of expected user groups.47
The economic costs of providing a warning are taken into 
account only for post-sale product warnings:
Compared with the costs of providing warnings
attendant upon the original sale of a product, the costs 
of providing post-sale warnings are typically greater.  
In the post-sale context, identifying those who should 
receive a warning and communicating the warning to 
them can require large expenditures.  Courts 
recognize these burdens and hold that a post-sale 
warning is required only when the risk of harm is 
sufficiently great to justify undertaking a post-sale 
warning program.48
As initially drafted, this comment would have required a 
post-sale warning “only if the risk of harm outweighs the costs of 
                                                
47. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. i.
48. Id. § 10 cmt i.
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providing a post-sale warning.”49  However, when an objection was 
made to this cost-benefit balancing language, on the ground that a 
warning could reasonably be required for a serious risk even if the 
cost of providing the warning might be thought to be greater than the 
expected harm, the reporters agreed and the comment was modified 
to conform to the blackletter of section 10,50 which only requires that 
“the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of 
providing a warning.”51
Courts have held that warnings need not be given of the risk 
of allergic or hypersensitive reactions unless the risk foreseeably 
affects an appreciable or substantial number of persons, but the use 
of this threshold requirement rather than the general (consumer-
oriented) “risk-utility” analysis has been criticized, and the 
Restatement Third states that what counts as “substantial” should 
vary depending on the severity of the expected reaction.52  As is 
generally true with respect to warnings or other types of information 
disclosure, “a product seller is not subject to liability for failing to 
warn or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance measures that 
should be obvious to, or generally known by, foreseeable product 
users.”53  On the other hand, for purposes of both design and 
warning, foreseeable uses are not limited to intended uses as 
envisioned by the product seller, and in most jurisdictions 
foreseeable uses include foreseeable misuse, which will not 
automatically undermine the prima facie case or automatically 
constitute contributory negligence or assumption of the risk.54
A few courts flirted for a brief period with a strict liability 
version of defective warnings, which was implemented by using 
hindsight rather than foresight.  Under the hindsight approach, a 
product warning (or lack thereof) is defective if, assuming that the 
product seller knew at the time that it sold the product what is known 
at the time of trial about the risks of the product, a (better) warning
                                                
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 cmt. i 
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 1996).
50. Am. Law Inst., Continuation of Discussion of Restatement of the Law 
Third, Torts: Products Liability (May 16, 1996), 73 A.L.I. PROC. 221, 223 (1996) 
(colloquy between Richard W. Wright and Aaron D. Twerski).
51. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 10(d).
52. Id. § 2 cmt. k; DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1008.
53. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. j.
54. Id. §§ 2 cmt. p, 17 cmt. c; GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 242-43.
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should have been provided about those risks.55  This hindsight 
approach to warnings, which never had much support, has virtually 
none now,56 although some courts shift the burden on proving the 
“state of the art” (the state of scientific and technical knowledge) at 
the time the product was sold to the defendant product seller and 
(incorrectly) describe this as a strict liability approach.57
D. Design Defects
While there now is widespread agreement on the proper 
definition and related ground of liability for construction and 
warning defects, there continues to be substantial disagreement and 
debate about the proper definition and related ground of liability for 
design defects.  Given recent developments, the disagreement and 
debate may be—as the reporters for the Restatement Third claim58—
more about language than substance, but even so, the language is 
important, as others have noted.59
The Restatement Second adopted strict liability for defective 
products in section 402A, without distinguishing among the various 
types of defects.60  The strict liability was implemented through a 
consumer expectations test, filtered through confusing “unreasonably 
dangerous” language.61  Comment g to section 402A states that a 
product is defective if it is “in a condition not contemplated by the 
ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him,”62
and comment i states that a product is “unreasonably dangerous” if it 
is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated 
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary 
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.”63  
                                                
55. E.g., Beshada v. Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), 
limited to its facts by Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374, 386-88 (N.J. 1984).  
56. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1004-05.
57. E.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (N.J. 1984).
58. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, Introduction at 4, § 2 cmt. b & cmt. 
b reporters’ note; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving 
Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 868-69, 871-
72 (1998).
59. E.g., GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 98-102, 108-12; Conk, supra note 14, at 
800-06, 807-08, 838-43.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmts. a & m (1965).
61. Id. § 402A & cmts. g & i.
62. Id. § 402A cmt. g.
63. Id. § 402A cmt. i.
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Comment k emphasizes that, assuming proper preparation and 
warning, a product is not defective if it is “unavoidably unsafe” due 
to “a known but apparently reasonable risk” because it is not 
possible “given the present state of human knowledge” to make it 
safe for its “intended and ordinary use.”64  The typical examples, 
noted in comment k, are vaccines or other drugs that have essential 
ingredients that pose known risks of adverse reactions in some or all 
users.65  Similarly, comment i notes the danger of sugar to diabetics, 
liquor to alcoholics (and others), and butter to potential heart attack 
victims, and the risks posed by over-consumption of many food and 
drug products.66
The great majority of states initially adopted the consumer 
expectations test in section 402A comment i as the sole test for a 
defective product, including design defects.  However, as problems 
arose in attempting to apply the test to design defects, many states 
supplemented or replaced it with some version of a risk-utility test.67  
Two of the problems with the consumer expectations test were noted 
by the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.68  
First, if the risks posed by a product are “open and obvious,” the 
consumer could not reasonably have an expectation of safety and 
would not be able to recover, no matter how unreasonably dangerous 
the product is, as some courts have held.69  Second, for some 
products “‘the consumer would not know what to expect, because he 
would have no idea how safe the product could be made.’”70
To avoid these problems, the Barker court supplemented the 
consumer expectations test with a risk-utility test and allowed the 
plaintiff to use either or both to establish a defective product design:
                                                
64. Id. § 402A cmt. k.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).  Comment k
also discusses “new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time or 
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, 
or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies 
the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.”  
Id.
66. Id. § 402A cmt. i.
67. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 975, 981-85.
68. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
69. Id. at 451; DOBBS, supra note 6, at 983-84.
70. 573 P.2d at 454 (quoting John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort 
Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 829 (1973)).
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[A] product may be found defective in design even if 
it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if through 
hindsight the jury determines that the product’s 
design embodies “excessive preventable danger,” or, 
in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger 
inherent in the challenged design outweighs the 
benefits of such design.71
Many courts followed California’s lead in adopting this two-
pronged test for a defective design.72  Others, believing the consumer 
expectations test to be generally unworkable for evaluating product 
designs, and that the ordinary consumer expects nothing more nor 
less than reasonable testing and design in the light of the foreseeable 
risks and benefits to the ordinary consumer, shifted to using only a 
risk-utility test.73  A substantial number of jurisdictions continue to 
employ only the consumer expectations test, but sometimes elaborate 
it using a risk-utility analysis that focuses on the risks and utilities to 
the ordinary consumer.74
In order to have liability for defective designs remain strict, 
as previously declared, rather than being based on negligence, the 
Barker court and a number of other courts using the risk-utility test 
declare that the product’s risks should be identified and assessed 
using hindsight rather than foresight.75  However, most courts do not 
do so, and even in those jurisdictions that theoretically use hindsight 
regarding knowledge of the risks posed by the product, the relevant 
technical state of the art often is deemed to be that which was known 
                                                
71. 573 P.2d at 454.
72. E.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884-85 (Alaska 
1979); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Ariz. 1985); Tran v. 
Toyota Motor Corp., 420 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2005) (Florida law); Ontai v. 
Straub Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 740 (Haw. 1983); Lamkin v. Towner, 
563 N.E.2d 449, 457 (Ill. 1990); Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 959 
(Md. 1976); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co., 406 A.2d 140, 150, 153 
(N.J. 1979); Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982); Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 937 F. 
Supp. 134, 139-40 (D.P.R. 1996) (Puerto Rico law); Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 
S.W.2d 527, 531, 533 (Tenn. 1996); Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 971 
P.2d 500, 504-05 (Wash. 1999).
73. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 985.
74. Id. at 981, 985 n.7, 986 n.14.
75. Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454, 457 (Cal. 1978); DOBBS,
supra note 6, at 989-91.
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or reasonably knowable by experts (whether or not it actually was in 
use) at the time the product was designed, rather than that which 
exists at the time of trial.76  In some jurisdictions, the burden of proof 
on the state of the art or the overall risk-utility analysis is shifted to 
the defendant,77 but, contrary to what is sometimes stated,78 shifting 
the burden of proof does not change the ground of liability from 
negligence to strict liability.  Few if any cases seem to have held a 
product seller liable based on risks that were actually unknown and 
unforeseeable at the time that the product was sold.
Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, the “risk-utility” test 
for defective product designs is not the aggregate-risk-utility test 
championed by efficiency theorists, which would trade off costs and 
benefits among product sellers, consumers, users and others in order 
to achieve a “socially optimal” maximization of aggregate utility or 
wealth.  Instead, the test, as with negligence analysis generally, 
focuses on the risks and benefits to those put at risk—in this context 
generally the consumers and users of the product—and employs a 
qualitative rather than quantitative comparison of those risks and 
benefits:  the foreseeable risks are unreasonable and thus negligent if 
they are significant unless they are not too serious and are necessary 
or unavoidable in order for those put at risk to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, desired benefits that substantially outweigh the risks.79  
Courts often reference the factors suggested by Dean John Wade, all 
of which except the seventh (which is sometimes mentioned but 
rarely relied on and never determinative) focus solely on the risks 
and utilities to the consumer or user of the product:80
                                                
76. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 991, 1032.  A significant issue on which courts 
and commentators disagree is whether the “state of the art” includes the 
knowability of the risks posed by the design or only the technology for dealing 
with those risks by, e.g., modifying the design.  Id. at 991; Potter v. Chicago 
Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1345-47 (Conn. 1997).
77. E.g., Barker, 573 P.2d at 455; Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 
311 n.8 (Cal. 1994) (reaffirming the burden-shifting rule); DOBBS, supra note 6, at 
987-88, 1033.
78. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 988.
79. Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand Formula,”
4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 145, 192-211 (2003) [hereinafter Wright, Hand 
Formula]; see infra note 95.
80. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 986; GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 97-98. 
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1. The usefulness and desirability of the 
product–its utility to the user and to the public as a 
whole. 
2.  The safety aspects of the product–the 
likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable 
seriousness of the injury. 
3.  The availability of a substitute product 
which would meet the same need and not be as 
unsafe. 
4.  The manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the 
unsafe character of the product without impairing its 
usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its 
utility. 
5.  The user’s ability to avoid danger by the 
exercise of care in the use of the product. 
6.  The user’s anticipated awareness of the 
dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, 
because of general public knowledge of the obvious 
condition of the product, or of the existence of 
suitable warnings or instructions. 
7.  The feasibility, on the part of the 
manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the 
price of the product or carrying liability insurance.81
While the direct benefits desired by those being put at risk 
and the indirect equal-freedom enhancing benefits to everyone in 
society are taken into account, the purely private benefits to the 
product seller or third parties are not taken into account.82  Indeed, 
                                                
81. John Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS.
L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973); see, e.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 
1319, 1330 n.10 (Conn. 1997) (quoting the Wade factors).  Similarly, the Barker
court stated that “a jury may consider, among other relevant factors, the gravity of 
the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would 
occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of 
an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the 
consumer that would result from an alternative design.”  Barker, 573 P.2d at 455.  
As Wade’s fourth factor indicates, the “financial cost of an improved design” is 
relevant only in the sense of making the product more expensive to purchase.  See 
infra text at notes 94-95.
82. STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 189; Wright, Hand Formula, supra note 79, 
at 211-23.
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defense lawyers are generally careful to avoid making arguments 
that seek to justify risks imposed on the plaintiff by allegedly greater 
enhancements of the defendant’s utility.  Defendants who are 
thought to have knowingly made such risk-utility decisions are often 
deemed by juries and judges not only to have been negligent, but 
also to have behaved so egregiously as to justify a hefty award of 
punitive damages, as occurred in the Ford Pinto, asbestos, and 
McDonald’s coffee-spill cases.83  Indeed, such aggregate-risk-utility 
decisions, whereby others are knowingly put at significant risk for 
the private economic benefit of the defendant, provide one of the few 
recognized bases for an award of punitive “exemplary” damages in 
England.84
In recent years, there has been a movement among the 
substantial number of courts that still use the consumer expectations 
test to limit its use to situations involving harm caused by the 
obvious failure of a specific product feature or function—for 
example, the failure of a wood lathe to hold the wood securely in 
place (as in Greenman)85 or of the brakes or tires on a new car.  The 
courts that have thus limited the consumer expectations test require 
the use of the consumer-oriented risk-utility test, which the 
Connecticut Supreme Court in Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool 
Co.86 calls a “modified consumer expectation test,”87 in “instances 
involving complex product designs in which an ordinary consumer 
may not be able to form expectations of safety.”88
                                                
83. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 813 (1981) (Ford 
Pinto); Jackson v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 399-409 & n.12 
(5th Cir. 1986) (asbestos); Andrea Gerlin, How Hot Do You Like It?, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 1, 1994, at A1 (describing the evidence and the reactions of the jurors and 
the judge in the McDonald’s coffee spill case); GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 221-24 
& nn. 58-59; STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 189, 222, 251.
84. Rookes v. Bernard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1226-27 (Lord Devlin); JOHN G.
FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 241 & n.152 (8th ed. 1992).
85. See supra note 12.
86. 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).
87. Id. at 1333-34.
88. Id. at 1333; accord, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 878-79 
(Ariz. 1985); Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308-09 (Cal. 1994); Tran 
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 420 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2005) (Florida law); 
Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 959 (Md. 1976); Suter v. San Angelo 
Foundry & Machine Co., 406 A.2d 140, 150, 153 (N.J. 1979); Knitz v. Minster 
Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982); 
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The Restatement Third states that a product “is defective in 
design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product 
could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative design 
renders the product not reasonably safe.”89  The words “reasonable” 
and “reasonably” in this definition are elaborated through a “risk-
utility balancing” test, which is described, in language remaining 
from the initial draft, as involving a tradeoff of costs and benefits to 
product sellers and users in order to create “incentives for 
manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and 
marketing products.”90  However, although the elaboration of the 
“balancing process” in the initial draft similarly described it as 
“reflecting a broad social perspective [that] takes a multiplicity of 
interests into account,”91 the factors specifically mentioned generally 
focused on risks and utilities to the consumer or user:
An important consideration is whether the proposed 
alternative could have been implemented at 
acceptable cost.  Other factors to be considered 
include the magnitude of the foreseeable risks of 
harm, the nature and strength of consumer 
expectations, the effects of the alternative [design] on 
product function, the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of proposed safety features, product 
longevity, maintenance and repair, esthetics, and 
marketability.92
                                                                                                                
Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 937 F. Supp. 134, 139-40 (D.P.R. 1996) 
(Puerto Rico law); Ray  v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 531, 533 (Tenn. 1996).
89. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2(b).  In the initial draft a 
hindsight approach was proposed for risks associated with foreseeable uses of a 
product.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 101 cmts. g & 
i (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1993).  However, in subsequent drafts the hindsight 
approach was replaced with an emphasis on foreseeable risks, although a remnant 
of the initial hindsight language still exists.  RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, 
§ 2 cmts. a & m.
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 101 cmt. b 
(Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1993); see supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 101 cmt. g 
(Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1993).
92. Id.
Symposium 2007] PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 1085
When I pointed this out at the initial meeting of the 
Members’ Consultative Group in 1993 and noted, as discussed 
above, that the cases focus on the risks and utilities to the consumer 
or user rather than on benefits to the product seller or third parties, 
the reporters agreed, and no one disagreed.  In the next draft the 
reference to “a broad social perspective” was eliminated, and the 
description of the relevant factors was rewritten and an illustration 
added to make clear the limited, consumer-oriented nature of the 
risk-utility test.93  These changes were retained through successive 
drafts without remark or dissent and appear with only minimal 
editing in the final adopted version of the Restatement Third:
The [relevant] factors include, among others, the 
magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of 
harm, the instructions and warnings accompanying 
the product, and the nature and strength of consumer 
expectations regarding the product, including 
expectations arising from product portrayal and 
marketing. . . .  [T]he likely effects of the alternative 
design on production costs; the effects of the 
alternative design on product longevity, maintenance, 
repair, and esthetics; and the range of consumer 
choice among products are factors that may be taken 
into account. . . .  [E]vidence of the magnitude and 
probability of foreseeable harm may be offset by 
evidence that the proposed alternative design would 
reduce the efficiency and utility of the product. . . .  
On the other hand, it is not a [relevant] factor . . . that 
the imposition of liability would have a negative 
effect on corporate earnings or would reduce 
employment in a given industry.94
As the last sentence of this quote makes clear, the references 
to the “likely effects . . . on production costs” and the “efficiency and 
                                                
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 101 cmt. h & 
illus. 6 (Council Draft No. 1, 1993).
94. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. f; see DOBBS, supra note 6, 
at 986 (noting the irrelevance of the manufacturer’s economic losses or reduction 
in employment from liability, but not commenting on the significance of this fact 
for the nature of the risk-utility analysis). 
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utility of the product” refer only to the impact on consumers’ utility, 
rather than to aggregate social utility in the economic efficiency
sense.  Illustration 7, which was illustration 6 when first inserted in 
1993, emphasizes this point:  “Although the increase in cost to 
consumers is a relevant consideration, the impact of a finding of 
defectiveness on the general economy or on the profitability of the 
[product] manufacturer is not a factor to be considered in deciding 
whether the alternative safer design is reasonable.”95
The major controversies surrounding the Restatement Third
have to do with its requirement that the plaintiff prove the
availability of a reasonable alternative design that would have 
reduced or avoided the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the 
product and its rejection of any (explicit) consumer expectations test.  
Many courts, while treating the existence of a reasonable alternative 
design as a factor to be considered in the consumer-oriented risk-
utility analysis of a product design, have refused to make it an 
absolute requirement.96  In a recent well-known case, Potter v. 
                                                
95. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. f, illus. 7.  The reporters’ 
note to § 2 contains a quotation from an article by David Owen, the editorial 
adviser to the reporters, which claims that the Restatement Third employs an 
aggregate-risk-utility, utilitarian-efficiency, “Hand formula” test of defective 
designs and warnings.  Id. § 2 cmt. a, reporters’ note at 41.  This claim is 
inconsistent with the substance and history of the Restatement Third’s definitions 
that are discussed supra text accompanying notes 43-51, 80-84, 89-95.  For 
criticism of Owen’s claim, which also is cited in the reporters’ note, that an 
aggregate risk-utility test would be consistent with the moral principles of freedom 
and equality, see Wright, Justice, supra note 14, at 167-94.  Mark Geistfeld 
recognizes and agrees with the consumer-oriented nature of the risk-utility test that 
is stated in the Restatement Third and employed by the courts, but he argues that it 
is “no different than” an efficiency-based cost-benefit test.  GEISTFELD, supra note 
6, at 37-38, 44; see also id. at 67, 100-101, 106-07, 111-12.  His argument (i) 
assumes that product purchasers engage in a risk-neutral, marginal tradeoff of 
expected risks of injury to themselves against product price but also give “equal 
consideration to the welfare of . . . other users, including employees” and (ii) 
ignores third-party interests such as effects on local employment and the local 
economy that are excluded from consideration by the Restatement Third and the 
courts.  See id. at 38-39.  Geistfeld himself subsequently notes that juries and 
judges “emphasize safety considerations over monetary costs” and “believe that 
the negligence standard is violated by corporate decisions based on a cost-benefit 
analysis of risks threatening serious bodily injury.”  Id. at 108-09; see supra text 
accompanying notes 79-84.
96. E.g., Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 & 
1331-32 n.11 (Conn. 1997) (summarizing the case law); Tran v. Toyota Motor 
Corp., 420 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2005) (Florida law); Delaney v. Deere & 
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Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,97 the Connecticut Supreme Court 
stated:
Contrary to the rule promulgated in the Draft 
Restatement (Third), our independent review of the 
prevailing common law reveals that the majority of 
jurisdictions do not impose upon plaintiffs an absolute 
requirement to prove a feasible alternative design.
In our view, the feasible alternative design 
requirement imposes an undue burden on plaintiffs 
that might preclude otherwise valid claims from jury 
consideration.  Such a rule would require plaintiffs to 
retain an expert witness even in cases in which lay 
jurors can infer a design defect from circumstantial 
evidence.  Connecticut courts, however, have 
consistently stated that a jury may, under appropriate 
circumstances, infer a defect from the evidence 
without the necessity of expert testimony.
Moreover, in some instances, a product may 
be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user even though no feasible alternative design is 
available.  In such instances, the manufacturer may be 
strictly liable for a design defect notwithstanding the 
fact that there are no safer alternative designs in 
existence.98
The Potter court’s second objection to the reasonable 
alternative design requirement overlooks comment e to section 2 in 
the Restatement Third, which provides, albeit reluctantly and too 
restrictively, for the possibility of liability without proof of a feasible 
                                                                                                                
Co., 999 P.2d 930, 945-46 (Kan. 2000); Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 
S.W.2d 47, 64-65 (Mo. 1999); Sternhagen v. Dow  Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 
(Mont. 1997); Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178, 1182-84 
(N.H. 2001); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 751-52 (Wis. 
2001); DOBBS, supra note 6, at 1001-02; GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 27-29; John 
F. Vargo, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a 
“New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects–A Survey of the 
States in a Different Weave, 26 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 493 (1996) (comprehensive 
survey of the case law).
97. 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997).
98. Id. at 1331-32 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
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alternative design in cases in which “the extremely high degree of 
danger posed by [the product’s] use or consumption so substantially 
outweighs its negligible social utility that no rational, reasonable 
person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use, or to 
allow [others] to use, the product.”99
The court’s first objection refers to a concern shared by 
many:100 the potential substantial adverse effect on valid plaintiffs’ 
claims posed by the great practical difficulty and expense involved in 
having to prove, as required by the Restatement Third,101 that an 
alternative design was technologically feasible, practical, and 
reasonable.  In an attempt to lessen concerns about the difficulty and 
costs of proving this, the Restatement Third states that (i) for some 
products no expert testimony would be needed, given the obvious 
availability of safer, reasonable alternatives, (ii) when expert 
testimony is required, the expert need not produce a prototype of the 
alternative design, and (iii) “the plaintiff is not required to establish 
with particularity the costs and benefits associated with adoption of 
the suggested design.”102
In addition, and more significantly, section 3 of the 
Restatement Third allows a res ipsa loquitur type of inference of a 
product defect, without proof of a specific construction or design 
defect or negligence. This inference is permitted, even when proof 
of a specific defect is possible under section 2, “when the incident 
that harmed the plaintiff: (a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a 
                                                
99. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. e.  Compare STAPLETON, 
supra note 6, at 260 (criticizing a reasonable alternative design requirement), with
GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 112-19 (defending a reasonable alternative design 
requirement as a means of excluding categorical product liability unless there are 
significant risks to bystanders).  Geistfeld’s argument assumes that consumers 
comparing product categories generally will have low information costs, in part 
because they supposedly need not consider the reasonable safety of the product 
design within any category (rather than across categories) because of “the tort duty 
[that] requires that each product design within any category must be reasonably 
safe” under the risk-utility test.  GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 113.  He ignores the 
fact that the reasonable alternative design requirement is intended to preclude 
product liability precisely in those cases in which the product arguably is not 
reasonably safe under the risk-utility test.
100. E.g., Am. Law Inst., Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, 
Torts: Products Liability, 71 A.L.I. PROC. 104, 131-32, 153-54, 155-56 (1994) 
(statements of Bill Wagner, Jerry Richard Palmer, and John P. Frank).
101. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. f. 
102. Id.
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result of product defect; and (b) was not, in the particular case, solely 
the result of causes other than product defect existing at the time of  
sale or distribution.”103  Comment b to section 2 explains that such 
an inference is permissible when, and only when, the harm is caused 
by the failure of a product “to perform its manifestly intended 
function.”104
Section 3 was drafted to cover the situations encompassed by 
the narrowed version of the consumer expectations test, which 
applies only when there has been an obvious failure of a specific 
feature or function of the product.105  In conjunction with section 
2(b), it mirrors the bifurcated test for design defects that has been 
adopted by a growing number of courts, including the Potter court: 
the consumer-oriented risk-utility test as a generally applicable test, 
supplemented by the narrowed consumer-expectations test that 
applies only when there has been an obvious failure of the product to 
perform a “manifestly intended function.”106
Although the Restatement Third asserts at one point that the 
narrowed consumer-expectations test, whether denoted as such or 
camouflaged as in section 3, is not “in apparent conflict with the 
reasonable alternative design requirement in § 2(b),”107 it otherwise 
acknowledges that they are distinct, alternative tests.108  The 
Restatement Third ignores the fact that section 3 purposely dispenses 
with the reasonable alternative design requirement and related issues 
when it claims that “consumer expectations do not constitute an 
independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product 
designs” and that “consumer expectations do not play a 
determinative role in determining defectiveness [because] 
[c]onsumer expectations, standing alone, do not take into account 
                                                
103. Id. § 3 & cmt. b. 
104. Id. § 3 cmt. b.
105. See Am. Law Inst., Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: 
Products Liability, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 179, 187-89, 197-98 (1995); Am. Law Inst., 
Continuation of Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Products 
Liability (May 18, 1995), 72 A.L.I. PROC. 201, 203-04, 207, 219-21, 231, 236-37, 
239, 242-43, 248-50 (1995) (statements of Richard W. Wright, James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, Oscar S. Gray, and Harvey S. Perlman); supra
text accompanying notes 85-88.
106. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. d, reporters’ note at 
71-73 (stating that the Potter court’s bifurcated test is equivalent to the 
Restatement Third’s provisions on design defects).
107. Id. § 2 cmt. b.
108. Id., Introduction at 4, § 2 cmts. b, d, reporters’ note at 45.
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whether the proposed alternative design could be implemented at 
reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design would provide 
greater overall safety.”109 In section 3, the Restatement Third
employs a criterion that, by focusing on a product’s “failure to 
perform its manifestly intended function,” invokes consumers’ 
expectations regarding intended functions that are implicit or explicit 
in the nature of the product and the manufacturer’s or other seller’s 
marketing of the product.
The expectations regarding a product’s specific features and 
functions, based on its nature and marketing, provide a standard for 
evaluation that, as section 3 assumes, is at least as “well-formed” as 
the consumer expectations that the Restatement Third finds sufficient 
for identifying defects in food products and used products.110  The 
Restatement Third glosses over this fact when it lumps design and 
warning defects together in order to claim that, unlike construction 
defects, they “cannot be determined by reference to the 
manufacturer’s own design or marketing standards because those 
standards are the very ones that plaintiffs attack as unreasonable.”111  
Design defects can be determined, and under both section 3 and the 
limited consumer-expectations test are determined, by reference to 
the product’s “manifestly intended functions” as indicated by the 
nature of the product and the manufacturer’s own marketing of the 
product.
Yet the reporters for the Restatement Third adamantly 
resisted any attempt to describe section 3 as a limited consumer 
                                                
109. Id. § 2 cmt. g.
110. See id. §§ 2 cmt. h, 7, 8(b)-(c) & cmt. b (discussing consumer 
expectations test for food products and used products).  Mark Geistfeld argues that 
a concept of reasonable consumer expectations is not needed if defect is defined as 
a product malfunction.  GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 60-61.  However, as explained 
in the text, identification of a product malfunction is dependent on a conception of 
the intended or expected functions of the product, which in turn is dependent on 
consumer expectations regarding specific features and functions of the product.  
Geistfeld himself seems to recognize this when he notes that the need to rely on 
consumer expectations in food cases extends to other product cases and states that 
“reasonable consumer expectations must be the default or background definition of 
defect” upon which other “more concrete or particularized definitions” such as the 
risk-utility test are based and which “fill the gap of incomplete product designs in 
food and other cases.”  Id. at 83-84.
111. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a.
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expectations test.112  The reasons given by the reporters and others 
for rejecting the consumer expectations rubric—its use to prevent 
liability for products with “open and obvious” yet unreasonable 
danger, its lack of guidance in situations in which no clear consumer 
expectations regarding a product’s features or functions have been 
frustrated, and its inapplicability to bystanders113—do not apply to 
the limited version of the test as a supplement to the consumer-
oriented risk-utility test, as a number of courts have observed and 
held.114
In the end, if one makes the effort to take into account all of 
the relevant sections and comments in the Restatement Third,115 it is 
generally consistent with the current content and structure of product 
liability law, although many jurisdictions disagree with its treating 
the existence of a reasonable alternative design as an independent
requirement for establishing a design defect, in addition to the 
consumer-oriented risk-utility analysis, rather than merely a relevant 
but not indispensable factor to be considered in the risk-utility
analysis.  However, as others have noted, the particular structure and 
rhetoric of the Restatement Third, which emphasize the reasonable 
alternative design requirement and unqualified risk-utility balancing 
and minimize the role of consumer expectations, give it a mean-
spirited appearance, at least, and perhaps a related effect, contrary to 
                                                
112. E.g., Am. Law Inst., Continuation of Discussion of Restatement of the 
Law Third, Torts: Products Liability (May 18, 1995), 72 A.L.I. PROC. 201, 219-21 
(1995) (colloquy between Richard W. Wright and James A. Henderson, Jr.).
113. Am. Law Inst., Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: 
Products Liability, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 179, 181, 184, 187 (1995) (statements of James 
A. Henderson, Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, and Mark G. Arnold); Am. Law Inst., 
Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Products Liability, 71 A.L.I.
PROC. 104, 127, 137-38 (1994) (statements of M. Stuart Madden, Robert L. Rabin, 
and Gary T. Schwartz); DOBBS, supra note 6, at 982-84.  The Restatement Third
properly rejects treating the “open and obvious” nature of some risk or danger as 
being an automatic bar to liability for a defective design.  RESTATEMENT THIRD, 
supra note 10, § 2 cmts. g & l.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88 and note 88.
115. Including the negligence per se provision in section 4(a), which 
provides liability for breach of a relevant governmental safety requirement without 
the need to prove a reasonable alternative design, and the distinct treatment of 
prescription drugs and medical devices in section 6.  RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra
note 10, §§ 4(a) & 6.  In his article in this symposium, George Conk presents an 
excellent discussion and criticism of the treatment of prescription drugs and 
medical devices in current law and the Restatement Third.  See Conk, supra note 
14, at 855-69.
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the consumer-oriented focus of section 402A that continues to be 
favored by many courts.116
III. RATIONALES
Having examined in Part II above the content and structure of 
current product liability law and its reflection in the Restatement 
Third, we can now consider the extent to which the current law and 
the Restatement Third’s provisions can be explained and justified by 
the various rationales that were relied upon by Justice Traynor in 
Escola, which continue to be relied upon in the Restatement Third.  
The discussion of each rationale begins with Traynor’s exposition of 
the rationale in Escola.
A. Efficient Compensation (Loss Spreading)
Those who suffer injury from defective products are 
unprepared to meet its consequences.  The cost of an 
injury and the loss of time or health may be an 
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a 
needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by 
the manufacturer and distributed among the public as 
a cost of doing business. . . .  Against such a risk there 
should be general and constant protection and the 
manufacturer is best situated to afford such 
protection.117
This rationale is an efficient compensation argument, using 
utility or happiness rather than wealth as the good to be maximized 
for society as a whole.  The argument is based on the assumption that 
the more widely and thinly a loss is spread, the less aggregate 
                                                
116. E.g., Am. Law Inst., Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, 
Torts: Products Liability, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 179, 182-84, 186-89, 194, 196-97 
(1995); Am. Law Inst., Continuation of Discussion of Restatement of the Law 
Third, Torts: Products Liability (May 18, 1995), 72 A.L.I. PROC. 201, 204-05, 209-
10 (1995) (statements of Marshall S. Shapo, Howard A. Latin, Richard W. Wright, 
Harvey S. Perlman, David G. Owen, Larry S. Stewart, Lee C. Swartz); GEISTFELD, 
supra note 6, at 28-29, 59-60, 100-01; Conk, supra note 14, at 800-06, 807-08, 
838-43.
117. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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unhappiness there will be, which in turn is based on the generally 
plausible assumption of the declining marginal utility of money (and 
every other good).  Product sellers are presumed to be better loss 
spreaders than injured plaintiffs (whether purchasers, users, or 
bystanders), since product sellers can spread the losses to their 
customers (by increasing product prices), employees (by decreasing 
wages), and stockholders (by decreasing dividends), or even more 
widely by purchasing liability insurance.  Although liability schemes 
generally are more expensive to administer and less often applicable 
than first-party or employer or government-provided health or 
disability insurance, many individuals still have little or no health or 
disability insurance.  Shifting from negligence to strict liability will 
increase the injuries for which product sellers are liable, thus 
increasing the spreading of losses, thus enhancing aggregate utility.
The Restatement Third invokes this rationale as a reason for 
holding wholesalers and retailers, as well as manufacturers, strictly 
liable for harm caused by construction defects:
An often-cited rationale for holding wholesalers and 
retailers strictly liable for harm caused by 
manufacturing defects is that, as between them and 
innocent victims who suffer harm because of 
defective products, the product sellers as business 
entities are in a better position than are individual 
users and consumers to insure against such losses.  In 
most instances, wholesalers and retailers will be able 
to pass liability costs up the chain of product 
distribution to the manufacturer.  When joining the 
manufacturer in the tort action presents the plaintiff 
with procedural difficulties, local retailers can pay 
damages to the victims and then seek indemnity from 
manufacturers.118
This rationale supports holding wholesalers and retailers 
strictly liable only if they are better loss spreaders than the injured 
plaintiff.  This often may not be true for small, single-store retailers.  
Even if the retailer is a better loss spreader than the injured plaintiff, 
there is no reason, from the perspective of efficient compensation, to 
                                                
118. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a.  
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hold the retailer liable if the manufacturer is a better loss spreader 
and the plaintiff can recover from the manufacturer.  In such a 
situation, even if the loss is eventually passed back to the 
manufacturer through contract or tort indemnification actions, there 
will be wasteful cumulative litigation costs that would be avoided by 
the direct action against the manufacturer.
The Restatement Third provides another argument for 
holding wholesalers and retailers strictly liable for construction 
defects, which could be interpreted as an efficient compensation
rationale, an efficient deterrence rationale, or an inferred negligence 
rationale:
[H]olding retailers and wholesalers strictly liable 
creates incentives for them to deal only with 
reputable, financially responsible manufacturers and 
distributors, thereby helping to protect the interests of 
users and consumers.119
The efficient compensation interpretation of this argument 
holds wholesalers and retailers (hereafter “proximate sellers”) 
strictly liable to give them an incentive to deal with “financially 
responsible” manufacturers and distributors (hereafter “remote 
sellers”) as a means of increasing the probability of efficient loss 
spreading through the remote sellers.  It assumes that the proximate 
sellers will either be able to obtain indemnity agreements from the 
remote sellers, which may not be possible, or will expect to face a 
substantially lower probability of being held accountable for some or 
all of a plaintiff’s injury if a financially responsible remote seller is 
available from whom the plaintiff can recover.  However, it suffers 
from the same problems of wasteful cumulative litigation and sub-
optimal loss spreading as the prior rationale.
These problems could be avoided if the availability of a 
sufficiently financially responsible remote seller immunized a 
proximate seller from liability, which is in fact the position adopted 
in many states and by the Restatement Third.  However, from the 
perspective of efficient compensation, this would be undesirable if 
the proximate seller is a better loss spreader than the remote seller—
for example, a large retail chain such as Walmart that sells goods 
                                                
119. Id.
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produced by a small manufacturer.120  In that situation, focusing on 
the relative loss-spreading capacity (and availability) of the retailer 
and the manufacturer would support a result that never occurs: 
holding the retailer liable and excusing the manufacturer.
A much more significant problem with the loss spreading 
rationale is that it is way too powerful.  As the New Jersey Supreme 
Court recognized and held in Beshada v. Johns-Mansville Products 
Corp.,121 before beating a hasty retreat two years later in Feldman v. 
Lederle Laboratories,122 the loss spreading rationale justifies strict 
liability not only for construction defects, but also for design and 
warning defects defined by using a consumer expectations or 
hindsight risk-utility test.  If these risks were unforeseeable to the 
manufacturer, they were even more unforeseeable to the injured 
plaintiff, and the manufacturer is assumed to be (and generally is) in 
a better position than the plaintiff to obtain insurance for (or to self-
insure against) unforeseen as well as foreseen product-related risks, 
or to spread the losses ex post to current and future consumers, 
employees, and shareholders.
Indeed, the loss spreading rationale would justify pushing 
liability much further.  If maximum spreading of losses is the goal, 
why allow the exclusion of liability, as occurs under both the 
consumer expectations test and even a hindsight risk-utility test, of 
the known risks posed by “unavoidably unsafe” products?  Why 
have any defect requirement?123  Why exclude liability in instances 
of unforeseeable use or misuse or allow a defense of contributory 
negligence?  Why apply strict liability to the provision of products 
but not services?  Why exclude liability for causing pure economic 
loss?124
                                                
120. See STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 94-95.
121. 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982), limited to its facts by Feldman v. 
Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374, 386-88 (N.J. 1984).  
122. 479 A.2d 374, 386-88 (N.J. 1984).
123. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 31-33.
124. See STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 91-92, 93-97, 324 (noting the failure 
of the loss spreading rationale to explain any of the boundaries of strict liability, 
including its inapplicability to services).  Perhaps prospective plaintiffs’ 
presumably better information about the expected magnitude of pure economic 
loss puts them in a better position than product manufacturers to insure against 
such loss, or most prospective plaintiffs, not being businesses, would not expect to
suffer pure economic loss and thus would not want the manufacturer’s cost of 
insuring against it to be included in the product price.  See id. at 206-09 
(discussing similar arguments).
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The efficient compensation goal, by itself, provides no limits 
on the liability of the best loss spreader.  Yet, for that very reason, in 
the end it argues against rather than for strict product liability, or 
indeed any sort of tort liability.  If the objective is to spread losses as 
thinly as possible, the best approach is not to expand 
administratively expensive and infrequently applicable tort liability, 
but rather to have the government provide or subsidize universal, 
adequate health and disability insurance.  Loss spreading would be 
maximized by eliminating tort liability entirely and moving to 
nationwide social insurance funded by progressive taxation.125
Another major problem with the loss spreading rationale, 
from the efficiency perspective, is that it conflicts with efficient 
deterrence: to the extent that a loss can be shifted or spread, there is 
less incentive to avoid it.126
A different “enterprise responsibility” loss sharing rationale,
which is motivated by fairness rather than utilitarian efficiency, 
might not be as expansive and might not displace tort liability, 
depending on how the “enterprise” is defined.127  The Restatement 
Third includes a version of this argument, which it describes as a 
fairness argument, among its potpourri of rationales for strict liability 
for construction defects: “[M]any believe that consumers who 
benefit from products without suffering harm should share, through 
increases in the prices charged for those products, the burden of 
unavoidable injury costs that result from manufacturing defects.”128
The principle of “fairness” in this argument is not clear.  
Enterprise responsibility would not further interactive justice or 
distributive justice.  Interactive justice does not seek to rectify all 
losses but only losses that result from unjust interactions—those 
involving conduct that is inconsistent with another’s right to equal 
negative freedom (security of person and property).129  Product users 
who benefit without injury from the use of a manufacturer’s product 
do not, by that sole fact, act inconsistently with the right to equal 
                                                
125. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 51-58; STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 93-94; 
David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 681, 706-07 (1980). 
126. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 64-65 (1970).
127. See STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 203-04 (discussing successively 
broader conceptions of the relevant “enterprise,” with correspondingly attenuated 
moral justification for spreading the loss).
128. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a.
129. Wright, Justice, supra note 14, at 165-66.
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negative freedom of other product users who unfortunately suffer 
injury.  Similarly, contrary to what its advocates seem to think, 
enterprise responsibility would not be an implementation of 
distributive justice.  Distributive justice seeks to promote, to the 
extent possible, each person’s equal positive freedom (access to the 
resources needed to pursue a meaningful life).  Implementation of 
distributive justice requires ranking all persons in society according 
to their relative resources and needs and then redistributing from all 
those who have more than their proper share of resources to all those 
who have too little.  Such society-wide calculations and 
redistributions are impossible in individual tort actions.130  More 
importantly, under strict product liability or any other tort action, 
defendants are held liable to injured plaintiffs regardless of the 
parties’ relative or overall wealth.  As Jane Stapleton notes, the loss 
spreading rationale for tort liability cannot be justified from a (non-
utilitarian) moral perspective:
The mere portrayal of insurance as a goal of tort law . 
. . undermines any moral justification of the liability 
of individual defendants because it is, in effect, an 
argument that losses should be shifted off the victim 
and then redistributed back via defendants’ prices to 
victims.  While the exploitation of individual 
defendants in this way may have pragmatic 
justifications in terms of convenience for buyers, it 
has no moral basis. . . . Moreover, in practice the 
system works unjustly as a insurance mechanism 
being . . . open to charges of paternalism and 
                                                
130. Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1859, 1887, 1890-91 (2000) [hereinafter Wright, Principles].  Although 
Stapleton’s applications of the principles of justice recognize their distinct focus 
and nature, her discussion of them includes some common misperceptions: (i) that 
they are not distinct principles of justice but rather only different perspectives of 
the same principle employed for analytical convenience, (ii) that Aristotelian 
“corrective” (interactive) justice is only concerned with correcting wrongs rather 
than defining them and thus depends on a prior theory of wrongs, and (iii) that this 
theory of wrongs is provided by distributive justice.  STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 
6, 201-02.  For discussion of these misperceptions, see Wright, Principles, supra, 
at 1883-91, 1183 n.113; Richard W. Wright, Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 
IOWA L. REV. 625, 691-708 (1992).
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allegedly perverse redistributional effects, in 
particular that it is fiscally regressive.131
In any event, as with the efficient compensation argument, 
the enterprise responsibility argument, if valid, would justify strict 
liability not only for construction defects but also for design and 
warning defects,132 non-defective products, services as well as 
products, and pure economic loss.  The Restatement Third does not 
attempt to explain how either argument can be restricted and 
contained.
Instead, when discussing why strict liability should not apply 
to design and warning defects, the Restatement Third merely states 
that, “[f]rom a fairness perspective, requiring individual users and 
consumers to bear appropriate responsibility for proper product use 
prevents careless users and consumers from being subsidized by 
more careful users and consumers, when the former are paid 
damages out of funds to which the latter are forced to contribute 
through higher product prices.”133  Once again, this argument, even 
if valid, does not distinguish construction defects from design and 
warning defects, defective products from non-defective products, 
products from services, or physical injury from pure economic loss.  
Moreover, it is not a valid argument for rejecting strict liability.  
Subsidization of careless users by careful users could easily be 
avoided by a contributory negligence defense to the strict liability 
action, without depriving careful users and bystanders of the benefit 
of the strict liability action.
                                                
131. STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 206.  On the other hand, as Stapleton also 
notes, to the extent that liability is indicated as a matter of efficient or consumer-
desired deterrence, it is incorrect to criticize it as inefficient or paternalistic 
compulsory insurance rather than as an efficiency or autonomy mandated 
“entitlement.”  Id. at 205-06, 208-09.  Stapleton proposes a theory of “moral 
enterprise liability” that relies on Tony Honoré’s pre-moral concept of “outcome 
responsibility.”  She argues that a person’s “taking of risks in pursuit of financial 
profit” provides a moral basis for holding product sellers strictly liable for injuries 
caused by their products.  Id. at 186-88 (emphasis in original).  This rationale is 
subject to all the criticisms made in the text against the broader “all those who 
benefit should share the burdens” form of the enterprise responsibility rationale.  
Stapleton herself notes the failure of her “moral enterprise responsibility” rationale 
to explain the boundaries of strict product liability other than its limitation to 
activities in the course of business.  Id. at 197-200, 219, 230, 244, 324.
132. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 66.
133. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a.
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B. Efficient Deterrence (Risk Reduction)
Even if there is no negligence . . . public policy 
demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will 
most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health 
inherent in defective products that reach the market.  
It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some 
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as 
the public cannot.134
This rationale is an efficient deterrence argument.  It assumes 
that total injury costs and prevention costs will be minimized by 
making whoever is the “cheapest cost avoider” for certain types of 
accidents strictly liable for all injury costs resulting from such 
accidents, whether or not that person is already exercising reasonable 
care.  That person will then have the constant incentive to take the 
most cost-effective measures to deal with such accidents.  Product 
manufacturers are presumed to be the cheapest cost avoiders for 
accidents involving their products: they are in the best position to 
discover and eliminate or mitigate, through appropriate design or 
warnings, the risks of injury created by their products.  They will not 
engage in excessive (inefficient) risk reduction, because when the 
costs of further risk reduction exceed the concomitant reduction in 
expected damages, they will choose to pay the expected damages 
rather than the greater costs of further risk reduction. 
The Restatement Third explicitly identifies the risk-reduction 
rationale for strict liability as an instrumental efficiency rationale and 
invokes it to support strict liability for construction defects:
On the premise that tort law serves the instrumental 
function of creating safety incentives, imposing strict 
liability on manufacturers for harm caused by 
manufacturing defects encourages greater investment 
in product safety than does a regime of fault-based 
liability under which, as a practical matter, sellers 
may escape their appropriate share of responsibility.  
Some courts and commentators also have said that 
strict liability discourages the consumption of 
                                                
134. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring).
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defective products by causing the purchase price of 
products to reflect, more than would a rule of 
negligence, the costs of defects.  And by eliminating 
the issue of manufacturer fault from plaintiff’s case, 
strict liability reduces the transaction costs involved 
in litigating that issue.135
Like the efficient compensation rationale, this rationale 
supports strict liability for design and warning defects as well as 
construction defects, as the Beshada court again recognized and 
held, and, furthermore, supports liability in the absence of any defect 
based merely on a causal connection between the product and the 
plaintiff’s injury.136  Assuming (as is certainly true) that product 
manufacturers are often not held liable for failing to disclose known 
or suspected risks to users of their products or for failing to develop 
alternative designs or products in the light of known or suspected 
risks, and are rarely if ever held liable for failing to engage in 
adequate research to discover and deal with the risks posed by their 
products, holding defendants strictly liable under the hindsight risk-
utility test or the consumer-expectations test will lead to improved 
risk-reduction, since defendants will have a constant liability-
generated incentive to take cost-justified precautions to reduce 
potential injury costs, whether or not plaintiffs can prove the 
defendant’s failure to take such precautions.137  
There also seems to be little reason under this rationale—
certainly less than under the efficient compensation rationale—to 
exclude recovery for pure economic loss.  While the plaintiff may be 
(better) able to insure against such loss,138 the product manufacturer 
generally will be in a much better position than the plaintiff to reduce 
the risks created by the product, especially since the plaintiff in cases 
                                                
135. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a.  The reporters’ note 
cites Guido Calabresi’s efficiency-based elaboration of these rationales and states 
that “[t]he foregoing rationales may be said to be ‘instrumental,’ in the sense that 
they reflect the view that tort liability is a means of achieving a more efficient 
allocation of resources.”  Id. § 2 cmt. a reporters’ note.
136. Beshada v. Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547-48 (N.J. 
1982), limited to its facts by Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 479 A.2d 374, 386-88 (N.J. 
1984); STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 130-31.
137. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 23-24.
138. See supra note 124.
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involving pure economic loss often will be a bystander rather than a 
user of the product.139
Furthermore, the efficient deterrence argument would seem 
to apply to sellers or providers of services as well as products.140  
The seller or provider of a service is in at least as good a position to 
reduce the risks posed by the service as the seller or provider of a 
product, and often in a better position since service-related risks are 
usually much more controllable than product-related risks and the 
provider of the service remains in control of the service while the 
provider of the product shifts control of the product to the product 
user.  Moreover, given this difference in control and involvement, 
the recipient of a service is often in a worse position to reduce the 
risks posed by the service than the user of a product.
The efficient deterrence rationale supports holding 
wholesalers and retailers strictly liable if they are the “de facto” 
product manufacturers who have contracted to have the actual 
construction done for them by someone else.  It also supports 
holding them strictly liable as an incentive for them to deal with 
manufacturers who engage in efficient risk-reduction or as an 
indirect means of encouraging efficient risk-reduction by 
manufacturers through indemnity actions, especially if the injured 
plaintiff cannot obtain jurisdiction over the manufacturer.  Although 
transaction costs might be lowered by immunizing the wholesaler or 
retailer from strict liability if the injured plaintiff can recover from 
the manufacturer, as provided by many states and the Restatement 
Third, there is no necessity to do so from the perspective of efficient 
deterrence.  Even without an indemnity agreement, the manufacturer 
is likely to pay all or almost all the damages, and retaining strict 
liability for the wholesalers and retailers will provide some incentive 
for them to put pressure on the manufacturer to engage in efficient 
risk reduction, even if they have an indemnity agreement.141
The Restatement Third makes several unsuccessful attempts 
to avoid the logical extension of the efficient deterrence argument for 
                                                
139. Mark Geistfeld’s discussion of pure economic loss, which contrasts tort 
liability with contract liability, focuses solely on economic loss to the purchaser of 
the product.  GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 199-207.
140. Id. at 248-51; STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 324.
141. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 244-45; supra text accompanying notes 24 
and 119.
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strict liability from construction defects to design defects and 
warning defects:
Many product-related accident costs can be 
eliminated only by excessively sacrificing product 
features that make products useful and desirable.  
Thus, the various trade-offs need to be considered in 
determining whether accident costs are more fairly 
and efficiently borne by accident victims, on the one 
hand, or, on the other hand, by consumers generally 
through the mechanism of higher product prices 
attributable to liability costs imposed by courts on 
product sellers. . . .
[The Restatement definitions of design and 
warning defects] achieve the same general objectives 
as does liability predicated on negligence.  The 
emphasis is on creating incentives for manufacturers 
to achieve optimal levels of safety in designing and 
marketing products. . . .  Society benefits most when 
the right, or optimal, amount of product safety is 
achieved.142
The reporters elaborate on this argument in the reporters’ note to 
section 2:
The rationale supporting the risk-utility-based 
standards for defectiveness in design and failure-to-
warn cases is implicit in those standards.  Liability is 
imposed whenever the designer or marketer of a 
product is in a relatively better position than are users 
and consumers to minimize product-related risks. . . .   
[T]he requirement that the plaintiff establish 
defectiveness in design and warning cases is 
necessary to create appropriate incentives to cause 
users and consumers to engage in safe use and 
consumption of products.  Users and consumers are 
relatively helpless with respect to harm caused by 
hidden manufacturing defects; but they are more often 
                                                
142. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a.
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better risk minimizers than are product sellers with 
respect to generic risks involving the inherent design 
of products.  Thus, users of knives are thought to be 
the appropriate actors to bear legal responsibility for 
the harm caused by the sharpness of such products.  
Liability for knife-related accidents unrelated to 
manufacturing defects should not be imposed on 
commercial sellers, who have no opportunity to 
design or market knives that are incapable of causing 
injury.143
These arguments ignore the availability of the contributory 
negligence and product misuse defenses in a strict liability action and 
the imbalance of information and expertise between product 
manufacturers and users, consumers, judges, and juries regarding 
known or suspected risks.  While consumers and users (but not 
bystanders) may be the cheapest cost avoiders with respect to proper 
use given known “unavoidable” risks—such as the sharpness of a 
knife—which are inherent in the desired functioning of the product, 
product manufacturers would seem to be the cheapest cost avoiders 
for unknown but potentially discoverable risks, risks of which they 
but not consumers are aware or should be aware, and known residual 
risks that exist despite safe and efficient use by consumers.
Improper, inefficient use by consumers could be averted 
through the contributory negligence and product misuse defenses, 
while retaining strict liability for the prima facie case against 
defendants to maintain the constant incentive for them to take full 
account of known risks and to engage in cost-justified research and 
development.  However, unlike current law as restated in the 
Restatement Third, which employs comparative responsibility to 
reduce but not necessarily bar recovery by a contributorily negligent 
plaintiff,144 efficiency theory states that, if there is a contributory 
negligence defense, it should be a complete defense, in order to 
minimize administrative costs.145  Moreover, it is doubtful that a 
contributory negligence defense is actually needed to deter 
inefficient behavior by product users, who independent of any such 
defense already have a substantial incentive to avoid injuries to their 
                                                
143. Id. § 2 cmt. a reporters’ note (citation omitted).
144. Id. § 17 & cmt. a.
145. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 175 (7th ed. 2007).
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persons and property, which given the uncertainties and cost of 
litigation and natural and legal restrictions on remediation will never 
be fully remedied and often will be totally or seriously unremedied 
even under a strict liability rule.146
The Restatement Third acknowledges that “[t]o hold a 
manufacturer liable for a risk that was not foreseeable when the 
product was marketed might foster increased manufacturer 
investment in safety,” yet claims that “such investment by definition 
would be a matter of guesswork.  Furthermore, manufacturers may 
persuasively ask to be judged by a normative behavior standard to 
which it is reasonably possible for manufacturers to conform.”147
The first point again ignores the problem of imperfect 
information by users, consumers, judges, and juries regarding risks 
and alternatives known to but not disclosed by manufacturers of the 
relevant product—as with asbestos and cigarettes for many years, 
and no doubt many other toxic substances.  It also overstates the 
problem of “guesswork” in manufacturer decisions to invest in 
research on possible risks and new technology.
The second point is a fairness argument rather than an 
efficient deterrence argument, which if valid would seem to apply to 
manufacturers’ efforts to avoid construction defects as well as design 
and warning defects.  Moreover, it is a misconceived fairness 
argument.  As the Beshada court pointed out, it incorrectly assumes 
that a manufacturer that is held strictly liable is being “judged” in a 
normative moral sense and being told that it should have behaved 
differently.148  Strict liability, by definition, is liability in the absence 
of moral or legal fault.  Holding a defendant strictly liable does not 
imply that the defendant should have behaved differently.  Indeed, in 
other tort contexts in which strict liability is employed, the defendant 
is believed to have been justified in behaving as it did but 
nevertheless is still held liable—for example, when a defendant 
intentionally trespasses on and injures the plaintiff’s property to save 
lives or much more valuable property,149 intentionally maintains a 
                                                
146. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 241.
147. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a.
148. Beshada v. Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546 (N.J. 
1982); STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 181-82.
149. E.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221, 221-22 (Minn. 
1910); Richard W. Wright, Principled Adjudication in Tort Law and Beyond, 7 
CANTERBURY L. REV. 265, 286-87 (1999) [hereinafter Wright, Principled 
Adjudication].
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private nuisance (a substantial interference with the plaintiff’s use 
and enjoyment of her land) and is made to pay damages but is not 
enjoined,150 or maintains an ultrahazardous activity and is held liable 
when injury occurs without any negligence.151  Even negligence 
liability does not necessarily imply moral fault or an assertion that 
the defendant could and should have behaved differently.  Insane, 
young, or “hasty and awkward” defendants who are held liable for 
intentionally or negligently causing some injury despite clearly being 
unable to conform their behavior to the objective “legal fault” 
standard of care are held liable not because they are deemed morally 
at fault but because of the need to protect the persons and property of 
those whom they injure.152
A similar misconception underlies the Restatement Third’s 
attempt to portray construction defects as involving an element of 
intentional injury that allegedly does not exist with respect to 
manufacturer decisions regarding designs and warnings:
Because manufacturers invest in quality control at 
consciously chosen levels, their knowledge that a 
predictable number of flawed products will enter the 
market place entails an element of deliberation about 
the amount of injury that will result from their 
activity.
. . . [T]he element of deliberation in setting 
appropriate levels of design safety is not directly 
analogous to the setting of levels of quality control by 
the manufacturer.  When a manufacturer sets its 
quality control at a certain level, it is aware that a 
given number of products may leave the assembly 
line in a defective condition and cause injury to 
innocent victims who can generally do nothing to 
avoid injury.  The implications of deliberately 
drawing lines with respect to product design safety 
                                                
150. E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (N.Y. 
1970); Wright, Principled Adjudication, supra note 149, at 287.
151. E.g., Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1262-65 (Or. 1982).
152. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 86-87 (Mark 
DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881); Richard W. Wright, Negligence in the Courts: 
Introduction and Commentary, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 466-82 (2002) 
[hereinafter Wright, Negligence].
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are different.  A reasonably designed product carries 
with it elements of risk that must be protected against 
by the user or consumer since some risks cannot be 
designed out of the product at reasonable cost.153
The knowledge that some conduct or activity repeated many 
times over an extended period is statistically almost certain to cause 
some number of injuries does not constitute intent to cause such 
injuries in common sense or law.  The “knowledge of a near 
certainty” type of intent exists only with respect to a discrete, 
concrete situation.154  Moreover, as the Restatement Third clearly 
assumes,155 there is at least as much conscious deliberation regarding 
types and levels of risk and hence statistically likely injuries in 
making decisions about designs and warnings as there is in making 
decisions about quality control in manufacture, and in each context 
the consumer or user (or bystander) must deal with the residual risk 
of injury.  The argument does not distinguish design and warning 
defects from construction defects.156
A common argument, not noted in the Restatement Third, for 
not extending strict liability from construction defects to design and 
warning defects is that, since the latter are generic defects that occur 
in every instance of the product, the total liability costs will be much 
greater than with nongeneric construction defects and may increase 
the price of the product so much as to put it beyond the reach of 
some consumers or even lead to the product’s being withheld or 
withdrawn from the market, even though the product is useful and 
apparently beneficial in the light of the risks that were foreseeable at 
the time that it was sold.  However, although the defect may be 
generic, the frequency with which the defect produces injury usually 
is quite low, often as low as the frequency of construction defects.  
Thus, for many design and warning as well as construction defects, 
the expected liability costs are such a small percentage of total 
                                                
153. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a.
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 
cmt. e (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  Richard Posner ignores this distinction, 
as part of his unsuccessful effort to provide an efficiency explanation for the 
existence of the intentional torts.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW § 6.15 (7th ed. 2007), criticized in Wright, Principled Adjudication, supra
note 149, at 288-89.
155. See supra text accompanying note 142.
156. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 65.
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production costs that they will not significantly affect production or 
prices.  Even when the expected liability costs are a significant part 
of the total production costs, if the expected costs of injuries caused 
by the product (including those due to broadly but not specifically 
foreseeable risks)157 exceed the utility of the product, as measured by 
the price that consumers are willing to pay, the efficient deterrence
perspective implies that the product should not be sold.  There is a 
problem, under the utilitarian but not the wealth-maximization 
version of efficiency theory, if consumers’ willingness to pay is 
hindered due to inability to pay.  However, if that is the case, as it 
may well be with some prescription drugs, the efficient solution 
would be for the government to subsidize the purchase of the 
product, while retaining strict liability as a constant incentive for 
efficient risk-reduction as well as efficient loss spreading.158
C. Inferred Negligence
The injury from a defective product does not become 
a matter of indifference because the defect arises from 
. . . unknown causes that even by the device of res 
ipsa loquitur cannot be classified as negligence of the 
manufacturer.  The inference of negligence [under the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine] may be dispelled by an 
affirmative showing of proper care.  If the evidence 
against the fact inferred is “clear, positive, 
uncontradicted, and of such a nature that it can not 
rationally be disbelieved, the court must instruct the 
jury that the nonexistence of the fact has been 
established as a matter of law.”  An injured person, 
however, is not ordinarily in a position to refute such 
evidence or identify the cause of the defect, for he can 
hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process as 
the manufacturer himself is.  In leaving it to the jury 
to decide whether the inference has been dispelled, 
regardless of the evidence against it, the negligence 
rule approaches the rule of strict liability.  It is 
needlessly circuitous to make negligence the basis of 
                                                
157. See id. at 150-56 (discussing insurance issues related to unforeseeable 
risks).
158. See STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 225-28 (discussing these issues).
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recovery and impose what is in reality liability 
without negligence.  If public policy demands that a 
manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality 
regardless of negligence there is no reason not to fix 
that responsibility openly.159
This argument by Traynor is ambiguous.  Although he 
discusses the great difficulty that plaintiffs face in proving that their 
injuries were caused by negligence in the manufacturing process, he 
seems more interested in setting aside concerns about proving 
negligence in favor of other arguments for strict product liability.  
Others have focused on the proof problems and have argued that 
those problems provide a strong reason for imposing strict liability
for construction defects.160  The others include the authors of the 
Restatement Third, who describe this argument as a “fairness” 
argument: “In many cases manufacturing defects are in fact caused 
by manufacturer negligence but plaintiffs have difficulty proving it.  
Strict liability therefore performs a function similar to the concept of 
res ipsa loquitur, allowing deserving plaintiffs to succeed 
notwithstanding what would otherwise be difficult or insuperable 
problems of proof.”161
This argument views strict liability for construction defects as 
being based on the inferred negligence rationale that underlies the 
traditional res ipsa loquitur doctrine.  The courts created the res ipsa 
loquitur doctrine to deal with situations in which the plaintiff’s injury 
probably was negligently caused by the defendant, but it is 
practically impossible or extremely difficult for the plaintiff to 
identify the specific negligence, especially when all the relevant 
evidence is under the control of the defendant.  Rather than deny 
liability in all such situations, the courts believe that justice is better 
served by allowing the factfinder to infer that the injury was 
negligently caused by the defendant if the plaintiff establishes two 
conditions: (1) the injurious event that occurred ordinarily does not 
                                                
159. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
160. E.g., GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 23, 25, 120; STAPLETON, supra note 
6, at 219-20, 265-66.  Geistfeld, however, treats this argument as an aspect of the 
efficient deterrence argument, as does the court in Beshada.  GEISTFELD, supra 
note 6, at 23-25, 65 n.17; Beshada v. Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 
548 (N.J. 1982). 
161. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a. 
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occur in the absence of negligence, and (2) other possible sources of 
causal negligence other than the defendant have been sufficiently 
eliminated or would not have been sufficient to produce the injurious 
event in the absence of negligence by the defendant.162
As applied to manufacturer liability for a product defect, 
these conditions require that the plaintiff prove that the defect arose 
while the product was under the control of the manufacturer, thus 
satisfying the second condition, and that such a defect ordinarily 
would not occur in the absence of negligence, thus satisfying the first 
condition.  The shift to strict liability retains the second condition but 
eliminates the first condition.  What justifies the elimination of the 
first condition for construction defects?
One argument that is sometimes made is that construction 
defects that arise during the manufacturing process ordinarily are due 
to negligence in that process, so that the first condition is always 
satisfied for a construction defect and need not be proven case by 
case.  This argument, however, is not obviously true for many 
products and production processes.  Especially as manufacturing 
processes become increasingly automated, construction defects may 
arise most frequently as “inevitable” imperfections that occur during 
the automated processing in the absence of any human error or 
inadvertence.  For example, in Escola, the majority, after noting that 
any visible defects in the bottles the defendant bottling company 
used should have been discovered through reasonable visual 
inspection, concludes that it was not likely that any of the new 
bottles used contained latent defects not discoverable by visual 
inspection because the supplier of the bottles employed pressure tests 
that were “almost infallible.”163  However, the pressure tests were 
                                                
162. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 370-71; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
328D (1965).  The last portion of the second condition is needed as a result of the 
shift to comparative responsibility, under which the plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence does not necessarily bar her recovery from a negligent defendant.
163. Escola, 150 P.2d at 439-40.  The bottling company also used recycled 
bottles, which were not subject to the same tests as the new bottles but rather only 
to visual inspection.  The court inferred from this that defects in recycled bottles 
would be discoverable by visual inspection, and stated that if this was not so the 
bottling company should either “make appropriate tests before they are refilled, 
[or] if such tests are not commercially practicable the bottles should not be re-
used.”  Id. at 440.  The court’s statement that recycled bottles should not be used 
without “appropriate testing” if they might contain defects not discoverable by 
visual inspection seems reasonable to me, and different than Mark Geistfeld’s 
description of it as requiring “that soda bottles should not be reused without a 
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done on only approximately one out of every 600 bottles, and the 
court does not mention how many of the tested bottles have latent 
defects.164  Presumably some do, and roughly the same percentage of 
untested bottles would be expected to have similar latent defects.  
One would need to know this percentage, as well as the percentage 
of tested and untested bottles with visible defects that pass without 
detection of those defects through the visual inspection process, 
which usually is impossible to obtain, to calculate the probability of 
an uncaught defect’s being the result of presumed negligence 
(because it was visible) rather than presumed non-negligence 
(because it was latent).
The Escola majority’s use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is 
an expansion of that doctrine, motivated by the same insuperable 
proof problems that motivate the traditional res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine.  The res ipsa loquitur doctrine permits an inference of 
negligent causation to be drawn against a defendant who probably 
negligently caused the plaintiff’s injury when the plaintiff, through 
no fault of her own but rather due to insuperable proof problems 
inherent in the situation, cannot identify and prove the specific 
negligent conduct of the defendant that caused her injury.  The 
Escola majority simply takes another modest step.  It permits an 
inference of negligent causation to be drawn against a defendant who 
may probably have negligently caused the plaintiff’s injury when the 
plaintiff, through no fault of her own but rather due to insuperable 
proof problems inherent in the situation, cannot establish specific 
negligent conduct of the defendant that caused her injury or a 
probability that the defendant negligently caused her injury.
Some might object that the extension of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine in Escola is a radical departure from, rather than a modest 
extension of, preexisting law and policy, on the ground that the 
traditional res ipsa loquitur doctrine, unlike its extension in Escola, 
does not involve any relaxation of the usual proof requirements but 
rather is a straightforward implementation of the “preponderance of 
the evidence” burden of proof, which merely requires establishing a 
greater than fifty percent probability of the fact at issue.  However, 
this interpretation of the preponderance standard, although 
commonly stated, is incorrect, as the courts generally realize when 
                                                                                                                
‘commercially practicable’ test that completely eliminated the risk of the bottles 
incurring hairline fractures.”  GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 23 (emphasis added).
164. Escola, 150 P.2d at 440.
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the argument is made in a naked statistical manner.  The statistical 
odds of something’s happening (e.g. a horse’s winning a race) can 
never establish what actually happened, no matter how high the odds 
are.  Proof of what actually happened depends on concrete evidence 
from the particular occasion that instantiates one story of what 
happened and discredits the instantiation of competing stories, to a 
degree sufficient to induce a minimal belief in the truth of the fact at 
issue.165
By permitting an inference of negligent causation based on 
non-particularistic, statistical evidence that the injury or accident 
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, the 
traditional res ipsa loquitur doctrine already constitutes a major 
departure from the usual requirement that the plaintiff prove that on 
the particular occasion the defendant actually was negligent and that 
the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury.  The fact 
that it is a major departure is implicitly acknowledged by most courts 
when they treat satisfaction of the conditions for the doctrine’s being 
applicable as only giving rise to a permissible inference of negligent 
causation rather than a rebuttable presumption, even when the 
defendant does not introduce any contrary evidence.  Apparently, an 
unease about allowing an inference that the defendant was negligent
in the particular case, based merely on the statistical fact that most 
such injuries are due to negligence, leads the courts to allow but not 
require the factfinder to make the inference, despite the adverse 
effect such a do-as-you-feel position has on equal treatment of 
similarly situated defendants and plaintiffs and the rule of law.  If it 
is applied, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine should result in a rebuttable 
presumption rather than a mere permissible inference, under both the 
traditional version of the doctrine and the expanded version 
employed in Escola.
One more step in the argument is needed to justify a non-
rebuttable presumption of negligence—in effect, strict liability—for 
construction defects.  The step is suggested although not articulated 
by Traynor in Escola.  A manufacturer’s rebuttal evidence on the 
cause of a construction defect almost always will be limited, as it 
was in Escola, to evidence of the manufacturer’s general quality 
control practices, which, as Traynor noted, merely reintroduces the 
                                                
165. Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, 
Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the 
Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1049-65 (1988).
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insuperable proof problem that the plaintiff faces given the 
impossibility of obtaining specific proof of what caused the 
particular defect.166  To avoid making the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine—and negligence liability for construction defects—
generally vacuous, the defendant should only be allowed to rebut the 
inference or presumption of negligence through specific proof of 
non-negligent causation of the defect in the particular instance,167 or 
at least through concrete evidence of the specific causes of a 
statistically relevant and valid sample of construction defects that 
establishes that most such defects are not due to negligence.  Rarely 
if ever will such evidence be obtainable, by the defendant or the 
plaintiff.  Even videotaping the actual production of each instance of 
the product and x-raying it at one or more crucial stages in the 
manufacturing process—which almost never occurs—is unlikely to 
document all or even most instances of negligence, and the 
videotapes and x-rays usually are not preserved.168  Doubts about the 
soundness and credibility of such evidence might support its 
rejection even in the rare instances when it might be offered.
This argument parallels the arguments underlying other tort 
doctrines that shift the burden of proof or allow proportional 
recovery in situations in which the defendant possibly tortiously 
caused the plaintiff’s injury but insuperable proof problems inherent 
in the type of situation prevent the plaintiff (and usually also the 
                                                
166. See supra text accompanying note 159.
167. A similar position was stated by the reporters for the Restatement Third 
with respect to the inference of a defect that is authorized under section 3 when a 
product fails to perform its manifestly intended function.  Am. Law Inst., 
Continuation of Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Products 
Liability (May 18, 1995), 72 A.L.I. PROC. 201, 245-47 (1995) (colloquy between 
Marvin L. Gray, Jr., and Aaron J. Twerski).
168. See McGonigal v. Gearhart Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 321, 323 n.1 (5th Cir. 
1986) (a manufacturer of hand grenades for the government was required to 
inspect by x-ray every fuse in every grenade, but the x-rays were destroyed in the 
normal course of business; res ipsa loquitur was used to infer negligent failure to 
detect a defective fuse in a grenade that exploded prematurely); “Somebody 
Cheated”, TIME, June 14, 1976, at 57, 59 (the consortium constructing the Alaska 
oil pipeline was required to inspect by x-ray every weld, but thousands of problem 
welds and shoddy and falsified inspections were discovered by an audit of the 
inspection process).
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defendant) from establishing the tortious cause of the injury.169  
Being unable due to the insuperable proof problems to resolve the 
interactive-justice issue between the parties under the usual, first-
best liability rules, the courts have developed second-best liability 
rules to do justice the best they can rather than giving up on doing 
justice.
In addition to the argument based on insuperable problems in 
proving specific negligence, there is a more direct negligence-based 
argument for strict liability for construction defects, which focuses
on the objective nature of the negligence standard and the rationale 
for that objective nature.  As previously noted, the negligence 
standard for those putting others at risk is an objective “legal fault” 
standard rather than a subjective moral fault standard.  Interactive 
justice requires that the standard be set at the level that is necessary 
and appropriate to secure others’ equal freedom and their related 
rights in their persons and property, and a person is held liable for 
failing to meet that standard regardless of the person’s ability to 
achieve it.170  Although it is impossible for any actual person always 
to achieve the relevant standard of care, the “reasonable person” of 
negligence law is the ideal person who always does so, and a failure 
to do so is negligent: “The actor is required to do what this ideal 
individual would do in his place.  The reasonable man is a fictitious 
person, who is never negligent, and whose conduct is always up to 
standard.”171
The proper level of safety for a product is set by the 
reasonable intended design.  A product that deviates from the 
reasonable intended design fails to achieve that proper level of 
safety.  If the failure is due to a human deviation from proper 
procedures in the manufacturing process, that human deviation, no 
matter how inadvertent or “innocent,” is negligent.  Otherwise, the 
failure must be due to some flaw arising in the nonhuman portion of 
the manufacturing process.  A manufacturer should not be allowed, 
by substituting machines for humans, to avoid liability for such 
                                                
169. See DOBBS, supra note 6, at 423-32 (discussing the courts’ shift of the 
burden of proof in successive-injury, crashworthiness, preexisting-injury, and 
alternative-causation cases).
170. Wright, Hand Formula, supra note 79, at 185-223; Wright, Negligence,
supra note 152, at 467-72; supra text accompanying note 152.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (1965); see id. § 289 
cmt. i (distinguishing the reasonable person standard from a standard based on the 
“average man in the community”).
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deviations from the ideal process, just as an employer is not allowed, 
by substituting others for herself, to avoid liability for inevitable 
human error and inadvertence.  The negligence of the employee is 
imputed to the employer, who is held strictly liable as a result of this 
vicarious liability.  Similarly, the flaw in the production process, 
which results in the product’s failure to achieve the level of care set 
by the reasonable intended design, is attributed to the manufacturer, 
who is held strictly liable as a result of this vicarious liability.172
Each of these negligence-based rationales not only is 
consistent with, but depends heavily on, the defect requirement and 
the prevailing definition of a construction defect.  Consideration of 
each also explains the lack of general strict liability for design or 
warning defects.
The second rationale relates a product’s deviation from the 
intended design to the objective nature of the negligence standard 
and the need for an objective standard to secure persons’ equal 
freedom and their rights in their persons and property.  While 
construction defects, as deviations from the intended design, result in 
the product’s failure to achieve the objective standard of safety set 
by the reasonable intended design, the issue for design and warning 
defects is precisely what the objective standard of safety should be, 
which is resolved through use of the interactive-justice-based 
negligence tests: the consumer-oriented risk-utility test for product 
designs and the foreseeable material risk test (with consideration of 
information overload issues) for product warnings.173
The strict liability rationale based on insuperable problems in 
proving negligence rests on two assumptions: (1) there is a 
significant possibility that there was negligence and (2) it is 
practically impossible for the plaintiff to prove such negligence.  
Both of these assumptions are much weaker in the design and 
warning context than they are in the manufacturing context.  
Regarding the second element, it generally will be much less 
difficult for the plaintiff to prove negligence in the overall design or 
in warning about the foreseeable risks, since both of these issues are 
evaluated in the light of (usually generally available) abstract 
technical and economic information, than to prove negligence in the 
                                                
172. Cf.  STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 247 (discussing courts’ treating 
“[d]eviations from the production line norm . . . , without more, as evidence of 
carelessness”).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47, 79-84, 93-95.
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manufacture of the particular instance of the product, which requires 
concrete evidence of what caused the flaw in that particular instance 
of the product.  There is an even more significant problem with the 
first element.  Unlike construction defects, which being deviations 
from the intended design often result from negligence, we do not 
ordinarily assume, merely because a product causes injury, that there 
is a significant possibility that it was negligently designed or that 
there was a negligent failure to warn.  Even when the design or 
warning seems unreasonable now in the light of current knowledge 
(the strict liability hindsight approach), that is not a sufficient basis 
for inferring that it must have been unreasonable in the light of what 
was reasonably foreseeable at the earlier time when the product was 
designed, manufactured, and sold (the negligence foreseeable-risk 
approach).
Nevertheless, there clearly is reason to be concerned about 
product manufacturers’ demonstrated ability to hide evidence of 
what they knew or should have known about the risks posed by a 
product (e.g., asbestos and cigarettes), and it is very difficult to 
establish negligent failure to engage in reasonable testing and
research.  Manufacturers generally have much better information 
than plaintiffs about the “state of the art” with respect to possible 
technology and product risks.  Although it is not generally 
impossible, as with construction defects, for plaintiffs to obtain the 
necessary information to prove negligence, it can be very 
burdensome for them to have to do so.  Requiring them to do so may 
result in their failure to prosecute, at all or sufficiently well, many 
valid claims of negligent design or failure to warn.  These concerns 
justify shifting the burden of proof, or at least the burden of 
producing evidence, to the manufacturer on the technical state of the 
art and knowledge regarding product risks, and perhaps also related 
economic feasibility issues, when there is a significant question 
about these matters.174  This has been done by a few states and 
                                                
174. STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 219-20, 265-66; supra text accompanying 
notes 96-98, 100-02.  Mark Geistfeld recognizes the force of the evidential 
difficulty argument for shifting the burden of proof to the defendant for design 
defects.  GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 120-22.  He nevertheless rejects shifting the 
burden of proof on the ground that it will not be beneficial to plaintiffs who 
already have strong evidence of negligent design, who will want to put their case 
to the jury first ahead of the defendant, but rather “is only likely to benefit those 
plaintiffs with weak cases,” who he assumes “could not establish negligence 
liability even if they had good access to evidence.”  Id. at 122-23.  The latter 
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partially by the European Directive on Product Liability.175  A larger 
group of states has gone further and uses hindsight risk-utility 
analysis, as the initial draft of the Restatement Third would have 
done, which theoretically results in true strict liability.176  The 
concerns about the difficulty and expense of proof also justify, as 
stated in comment f to section 2 of the Restatement Third, foregoing 
the need to engage in a detailed risk-utility analysis when the 
availability of a reasonable, safer alternative design is obvious.177  
They justify, as stated in section 3 of the Restatement Third and held 
by many courts, dispensing with the need to prove negligence when 
there was an obvious failure of a specific intended or advertised 
feature or function of the product,178 which almost always will 
involve either a construction defect (for which there is strict liability 
based on inferred negligence), a negligent design, or a negligent 
failure to warn.
The inferred-negligence rationales discussed so far do not 
apply to wholesalers or retailers or others in the chain of distribution 
of the product, who generally are not involved in the manufacture or 
design of the product or the formulation of the product warnings but 
rather are mere conduits through which products pass.  These non-
manufacturers can be held liable under normal negligence rules for a 
construction defect caused by their own negligent mishandling of the 
product or for a negligent failure to warn of product risks of which 
they are aware or should be aware.  The only reason to hold them 
liable for defects attributable to the manufacturer is if they failed to 
exercise reasonable care to deal in products from manufacturers who 
could reasonably be expected to take proper care in designing and 
manufacturing those products and warning about the related risks 
and who would be available to compensate plaintiffs for any injuries 
                                                                                                                
assumption inexplicably ignores the whole point of the argument for shifting the
burden, which he recognizes as being “persuasive when [doing so] enables 
plaintiffs with meritorious claims to overcome the evidential difficulties they 
would otherwise face in establishing negligence.”  Id. at 123.  Even for those with 
strong cases, the shift of the burden of production may enable them to build a 
stronger case prior to the trial without losing the advantage of presenting their case 
first during the trial.
175. STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 236-42, 265-66; supra note 77.
176. See supra note 89 and text accompanying note 75.
177. See supra text accompanying note 102.
178. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 105-06; supra text accompanying notes 85-
88, 103-06.
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nevertheless caused by construction defects (which involve inferred 
negligence) or negligent design or warning.  While obvious failures 
of non-manufacturers to exercise such care could be proven through 
normal negligence analysis, non-obvious failures might be very 
difficult to prove, which could justify using the inferred negligence 
rationale to hold the non-manufacturer strictly liable unless the 
manufacturer is subject to suit by the plaintiff and solvent, especially 
since the non-manufacturer can avoid the strict liability by only 
dealing in products of manufacturers who are available and solvent.  
This rule has been adopted by many jurisdictions, but others hold 
non-manufacturers vicariously strictly liable for defects attributable 
to the manufacturer even when the manufacturer is available and 
solvent.179
The inferred-negligence rationales support the distinction 
between products and services, since proving negligent service, 
although sometimes difficult, will generally not involve the 
insuperable proof problems that almost always exist when attempting 
to prove the specific negligent cause of a construction defect, nor be 
as difficult or burdensome as trying to establish a negligent 
design.180  Non-liability for pure economic loss is also easily 
justifiable, as a simple application of the preexisting rule disallowing 
recovery for pure economic loss in ordinary negligence actions, on 
the grounds that no interference with the plaintiff’s rights has taken 
place in the absence of physical interference with the plaintiff’s 
person or property, and that physical injury to the product itself 
merely results in a non-working product and thus a failure of the 
plaintiff’s economic expectations regarding the utility of the product, 
which is properly handled through contract law rather than tort 
law.181  Similarly, the defenses of contributory negligence and 
assumption of the risk apply, as usual in negligence law, for reasons 
of justice rather than efficient deterrence.182  Finally, since the 
inferred-negligence rationales are an extension of traditional 
                                                
179. STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 243-44; supra text accompanying notes 
21-24.
180. William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services 
in Strict Liability, 62 N.C. L. REV. 415, 422-23, 425-26, 428-30 (1984).  But see
STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 325-26 (criticizing the difficulty-of-proof rationale 
for treating products and services differently).
181. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 199-207; STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 278.
182. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 241; Wright, Principled Adjudication,
supra note 149, at 283-86.
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negligence liability, they easily explain recovery by remote users and 
bystanders183 and the inapplicability of contractual privity 
requirements, disclaimers, and limitations.
D. Consumer Expectations
The retailer, even though not equipped to test 
a product, is under an absolute liability to his 
customer, for the implied warranties of fitness for 
proposed use and merchantable quality include a 
warranty of safety of the product.  This warranty is 
not necessarily a contractual one, for public policy 
requires that the buyer be insured at the seller’s 
expense against injury.  The courts recognize, 
however, that the retailer cannot bear the burden of 
this warranty, and allow him to recoup any losses by 
means of the warranty of safety attending the 
wholesaler’s or manufacturer’s sale to him.  Such a 
procedure, however, is needlessly circuitous and 
engenders wasteful litigation.  Much would be gained 
if the injured person could base his action directly on 
the manufacturer’s warranty.184
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass 
production with its great markets and transportation 
facilities, the close relationship between the producer 
and consumer of a product has been altered.  
Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, 
                                                
183. As Mark Geistfeld ably discusses, bystanders are entitled to a standard 
of care at least as protective as that afforded to users of a product, and to one that 
is more protective when the benefits desired by consumers that justify a certain 
level of risk do not accrue to or are not desired by bystanders.  GEISTFELD, supra
note 6, at 39-40, 118-19, 252-59; accord, STAPLETON, supra note 6, at 235-36.  
Significant risks to non-participants in a risky activity are justified as a matter of 
interactive justice only if they are unavoidable risks of a socially valuable activity 
(not in a utilitarian-efficiency, aggregate-risk-utility sense, but because the activity 
enhances the equal freedom of everyone in society, including the non-participants) 
and the benefits to the non-participants’ equal freedom substantially outweigh the 
risks, which are not too serious and cannot be reduced without loss of those 
benefits.  Wright, Hand Formula, supra note 79, at 203-11.
184. Escola, 150 P.2d at 441-42 (Traynor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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are ordinarily either inaccessible to or beyond the ken 
of the general public.  The consumer no longer has 
means or skill enough to investigate for himself the 
soundness of a product, even when it is not contained 
in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has 
been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to 
build up confidence by advertising and marketing 
devices such as trade-marks.  Consumers no longer 
approach products warily but accept them on faith, 
relying on the reputation of the manufacturer or the 
trade mark.  Manufacturers have sought to justify that 
faith by increasingly high standards of inspection and 
a readiness to make good on defective products by 
way of replacements and refunds.  The 
manufacturer’s obligation to the consumer must keep 
pace with the changing relationship between them; it 
cannot be escaped because the marketing of a product 
has become so complicated as to require one or more 
intermediaries.  Certainly there is greater reason to 
impose liability on the manufacturer than on the 
retailer who is but a conduit of a product that he is not 
himself able to test.185
The first quotation reflects the sales law background of this 
rationale.  Sales law developed an implied warranty of 
merchantability regarding the quality of a product—its fitness for the 
ordinary purposes for which it was sold—to replace the earlier 
regime of “caveat emptor” (let the buyer beware).  As with contract 
law generally, liability for breach of the warranty is strict.  Liability 
does not depend on proof of negligence, but it does depend on proof 
that the product contains a defect or deviation from the norm that 
renders it unmerchantable.  Initially, again as with contract law 
generally, the implied warranty only encompassed the expected 
economic value or utility of the product.  However, when tort law 
took a wrong turn from which it took a long time to recover, by not 
allowing a person injured by a product to hold the manufacturer (or 
any remote seller) of the product liable for negligently causing that 
injury unless he was in privity of contract with the manufacturer, 
                                                
185. Id. at 443-44 (citations omitted).
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sales law was modified to allow recovery against the immediate 
seller under the implied warranty of merchantability, who could then 
sue her immediate seller on the same basis, and so on back to the 
manufacturer.  However, not only was this backtracking “needlessly 
circuitous and . . . wasteful,” ultimate passage of liability back to the 
manufacturer would not occur if a link in the chain was broken by 
the unavailability or insolvency of, or a disclaimer or limitation of 
liability by, the seller occupying that link.  Moreover, recovery under 
the warranty was—and to some extent continues to be—burdened by 
inspection, reliance, and notice of injury requirements.186
Traynor and others argued, ultimately successfully,187 that the 
injured plaintiff should be allowed a direct action in tort against the 
manufacturer, free of all the limitations imposed by sales law but 
retaining sales law’s strict liability, based on the same reasonable 
consumer expectation of product quality regarding safety that had 
been imported into sales law to remedy the plaintiff’s inability, at the 
time that the importation occurred, to sue the manufacturer in tort.188  
The basis for the consumer’s reasonable expectation of safety, which 
sounds in tort rather than contract, is laid out in the second quote 
above.189  Once the tort action against the manufacturer became 
available, the distortion of sales law to include expectations 
regarding the safety of a product in addition to expectations 
regarding its economic value and utility no longer is necessary or 
(perhaps) appropriate, but rather than being eliminated it has been 
retained, along with further distortions such as the elimination, for 
claims involving personal injury only, of the privity requirement and 
the ability to disclaim or limit warranties.190
As with all the other rationales, the Restatement Third asserts 
that the consumer expectatons rationale supports strict liability for 
construction defects, but not design and warning defects:
Products that malfunction due to manufacturing 
defects disappoint reasonable consumer expectations 
                                                
186. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to 
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-1103, 1123-34 (1960).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & cmts. f, g, i, m (1965); 
supra text accompanying notes 3-7, 27-28, 60-63.
188. Prosser, supra note 186, at 1122-24, 1134; Escola, 150 P.2d at 440, 
442-44 (Traynor, J., concurring)
189. See supra text accompanying note 185.
190. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1977).
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of product performance. . . .  Consumer expectations 
as to proper product design or warning are typically 
more difficult to discern than in the case of a 
manufacturing defect. . . .  [S]uch defects cannot be 
determined by reference to the manufacturer’s own 
design or marketing standards because those 
standards are the very ones that plaintiffs attack as 
unreasonable.191
Once again, the asserted distinction does not hold up.  Just as 
construction defects can be defined as a failure of the product to 
conform to the intended design, section 3 of the Restatement Third
acknowledges that design defects can in part be defined as an 
obvious failure of the product to perform a clearly intended function.  
The product’s clearly intended functions, which are indicated by the 
nature of the product and the manufacturer’s marketing, are viewed 
from the perspective of the reasonable consumer.192  Consumer 
expectations also play a decisive role in the other test for a defective 
design, the consumer-oriented risk-utility test, under which risks are 
reasonable only if they are acceptable from the standpoint of the 
ordinary consumer.193
Moreover, contrary to the Restatement Third’s assertion, 
reasonable consumer expectations do not explain strict liability for 
construction defects, nor indeed, unlike with design defects, play any 
role in the definition of construction defects.  In the absence of a 
disclaimer or warning, product purchasers do have a general 
expectation that the products they purchase will be fit and safe for 
their intended purposes, but they are also aware that sometimes 
products are defective (“lemons”) and that product warranties (if 
they exist) are limited to fairly brief periods and often exclude 
liability for consequential damages.  A consumer expectation of no 
defects and complete safety is unrealistic, and moreover would 
justify strict liability not only for construction defects but also for 
design and warning defects, and indeed in the absence of any defect.  
In the end, all that consumers can reasonably expect is that product 
manufacturers will take reasonable care in designing and 
                                                
191. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 10, § 2 cmt. a (order of text 
switched).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 109-14.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84, 93-95. 
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manufacturing products and warning about related risks, which is the 
negligence standard.194  The shift from negligence to strict liability 
for any type of defect cannot be explained by the consumer 
expectations rationale, but rather only by the inferred negligence 
rationales.195
There are other problems with the consumer expectations 
rationale as an independently sufficient explanation and justification 
of current product liability law.  It cannot explain liability to 
bystanders.  It would allow liability to be excluded or limited by 
explicit disclaimers and limitations, or if the danger posed by the 
product, no matter how unreasonable, is “open and obvious.”  It 
would preclude liability for any unintended use of the product.  It 
does not provide a reason for distinguishing between products and 
services or for precluding liability for pure economic loss when it is 
employed outside of sales law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current product liability law is a negligence-based liability 
regime.  Its content and structure, including its strict liability 
features, can all be explained in terms of negligence law.  The strict 
liability that exists for construction defects, for clear failures of 
products to perform their intended functions, and for non-
manufacturers in the chain of distribution of products (if they are 
allowed to avoid liability when the manufacturer can be held liable) 
is based on and supportable only by inferred negligence.
Consumer expectations play a vital role in negligence law in 
general and product liability law in particular.  The risk-utility test in 
product liability law is not an efficiency-oriented aggregate-cost-
benefit test, according to which risks and harms to some are justified 
by benefits to others, but rather a consumer-oriented test which 
conforms to the general test in negligence law for those putting 
others at risk.  According to this general test, the creation of 
significant foreseeable risks to others is unreasonable unless the risks 
are substantially outweighed by direct or indirect desired benefits to 
those put at risk, cannot be reduced further without loss of those 
                                                
194. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 29-30; Owen, supra note 125, at 693.  
195. GEISTFELD, supra note 6, at 23-26; Powers, supra note 180, at 428-30, 
432-34; supra Part III.C.
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desired benefits, are not too serious, and are made known to those 
put at risk through proper warnings.  The Restatement Third’s 
consumer-oriented risk-utility test for design defects and consumer-
oriented material significance test for required warnings are proper 
elaborations of this general test in the product liability context.
Unfortunately, however, the Restatement’s overall structure 
and rhetoric, which denigrates consumer expectations and 
emphasizes optimal risk reduction and unqualified risk-utility 
balancing for product designs and warnings, conveys a quite 
different, consumer-unfriendly impression.  This impression is 
reinforced by the Restatement Third’s invocation of and primary 
reliance on (albeit only superficially) the normatively unattractive 
efficiency rationales, especially the efficient deterrence rationale, 
which is doubly unfortunate because, as the Beshada opinion 
accurately explains, the efficiency rationales lead to the unprincipled, 
unbounded liability that the Restatement Third is eager to avoid.
The reporters for the Restatement Third defended the 
inclusion of the efficiency rationales on the ground that they often 
appear, or at least used to appear, in court opinions.196  The fact that 
they are mentioned in court opinions makes it even more important 
to emphasize that these rationales do not support and cannot explain 
a properly limited and just law of product liability, in order to avoid 
excesses such as the Beshada opinion and to provide a more 
principled and coherent ground for judicial decision-making.  The 
Restatement Third’s adoption of a supposedly neutral “functional” 
approach, layered in efficiency rhetoric but with only a superficial 
and transparently incoherent discussion of the efficiency rationales 
and other proffered rationales, left it without an appealing, coherent
normative base and thereby undermined, and continues to 
undermine, both its acceptance by and its helpfulness to courts and 
others seeking a principled law of product liability.
                                                
196. Am. Law Inst., Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: 
Products Liability, 71 A.L.I. PROC. 104, 136-37 (1994) (colloquy among Richard 
W. Wright, Aaron D. Twerski and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.).  Twerski subsequently 
claimed that the Restatement Third’s discussion of the various rationales does 
justify treating design and warning defects differently than construction defects.  
Am. Law Inst., Discussion of Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: Products 
Liability, 72 A.L.I. PROC. 179, 198 (1995) (statement of Aaron D. Twerski).
